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A SOVIET PARADE OF HORRIBLES: CONSERVATISM IN GLASNOST-ERA 
DISCOURSES ON SEX, 1987-1991 
 
Svetlana Ter-Grigryan    May 2016                     103 Pages 
Directed by: Marko Dumančić, Eric Reed, and Dorothea Browder 
Department of History                           Western Kentucky University 
Between 1987 and 1991, Soviet filmmakers and journalists utilized Gorbachev’s 
glasnost reform policy to depict or discuss sexuality in cinema and the popular press. I 
argue that Soviet film and popular press discourses on sex in this period reveal a 
continuity of conservative sexual mores, which were interwoven with social and moral 
conservatism regarding the centerpiece of Soviet society, the Soviet family. Furthermore, 
these discourses take on a fundamentally misogynistic tone, in that women are tasked 
with defending sexual purity, and thus familial integrity, while simultaneously being cast 
as those most susceptible to the power of sexual enticement. Thus, the comparatively 
permissive discourse about sex and sexuality in the 1980s can be interpreted not as a 
“sexual revolution,” but as an explosion in social and moral anxieties, that were unique to 
the glasnost period, about the Soviet way of life. Additionally, this study challenges the 
concept of the totalitarian Soviet system by highlighting intellectuals’ persevering 
conservatism during a period where the state did not expressly govern or censor 
discourses on sex and sexuality. 
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INTRODUCTION: A SOVIET PARADE OF HORRIBLES 
 The April 27, 1991 issue of Sovetskaia kul’tura featured a full-page article titled 
“The Magic of the Forbidden Fruit,” a discussion about the recent wave of erotica, 
pornography, and general “sexual permissiveness” sweeping the USSR in the late 1980s 
and early 90s.1 Encased within the text is a sizable photo (Figure 1) of a topless woman 
sunbathing, and a photographer who has broken off from a large group of people to 
voyeuristically photograph the unaware woman. The photo represents the unique gender 
and sexuality anxieties of the glasnost period to full effect. The freedom that came with 
glasnost to showcase the nude form, even in a nonsexual way, is undercut here by a sense 
of impending danger. The photograph suggests that the man, who has departed from a 
crowd to snap photos of the sunbather, may be a predator in the making. The woman, on 
the other hand, lays oblivious to her two photographers and ignorant of the sorts of 
troubles her nudity may bring. Ironically, the photographer who captures the scene acts as 
a secondary voyeur. The photojournalist, representing intellectuals more broadly, is given 
a pass to depict nudity while he simultaneously decries its destructive power. Featuring 
this photo, the journalists would argue, is for the ultimate benefit of the readers. By 
characterizing sex as predatory or destructive, intellectuals behind glasnost-era 
journalistic and cultural discourses utilized sex as a proxy to address social and moral 
anxieties. This ostensible parade of horribles privileged intellectuals’ use of sex as 
subject matter, because their productions acted as discursive proxies which addressed 
perceived societal problems.  Intellectuals between 1987 and 1991 embodied the 
supposed social transparency of the glasnost period by shocking Soviets with a sort of 
                                                                
1 Dalila Akivic, “Magiia zapretnogo ploda,” Sovetskaia kul’tura, April 27, 1991. 
 
 
 2  
 
aversion therapy. This is the paradoxical context in which discourse on sex in the 
glasnost period was situated. 
 
Figure 1. Topless woman sunbathing (photo by S. Kompaniichenko) 
  
Increased visibility of sexuality in public discourse is frequently tied to expanded 
social, moral, and cultural liberalism. Such was the case with the Sexual Revolution in 
the West during the late 1960s. This connection is also made in regards to discourses on 
sex in the last years of the Soviet Union, known as the perestroika and glasnost era, 
referring to Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform policies. Following the premiere of Gorbachev’s 
glasnost reform, political scientists and communications scholars generally regarded 
glasnost as politically and culturally “liberating,” at least in the western sense of the 
word.2 Political scientist Isaac J. Tarasulo, for example, argued in 1989 that sexuality in 
                                                                
2 Communication scholars and political scientists such as Joseph Gibbs, Isaac J. Tarasulo, and 
Elena Androunas argued in the late 1980s and early 1990s that the journalistic discourses of the glasnost 
era represented expanded social and moral liberalism in the Soviet Union. Their definitions of “liberalism,” 
however, typically drew from western notions of egalitarian society, as well as democratic capitalism. 
Joseph Gibbs, Gorbachev’s Glasnost: The Soviet Media in the First Phase of Perestroika (College Station: 
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art and the popular press represented a foothold into moral, philosophical, and cultural 
“progression” for the Soviet Union.3 The assumption that sex discourse during the 
perestroika years was a sign of liberalism are bolstered when considering that the 
discourses were made possible by Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost reform policy, which 
softened official censorship in many facets of social and cultural expression. 
Furthermore, these discourses occurred in the years leading up to Russia’s transition to 
democracy. Yet examining the two most far-reaching cultural and social mediums, 
cinema and the popular press, complicates the presumption of liberalism. Filmmakers and 
journalists, members of the intelligentsia class, utilized the new freedoms of glasnost to 
portray and discuss sex. Their use of sex as a discursive proxy, however, did not reflect 
intellectuals’ increased acceptance for sexual permissiveness.  
I argue that Soviet film and popular press discourses on sex in the glasnost period, 
between 1987 and 1991, reveal a continuity of conservative sexual mores, which were 
interwoven with Bolshevik social and moral ideology regarding the centerpiece of Soviet 
society, the Soviet family. Furthermore, these discourses take on a fundamentally 
misogynistic tone, in that women are tasked with defending sexual purity, and thus 
familial integrity, while simultaneously being cast as those most morally and physically 
susceptible to sexual perversion. In essence, the intelligentsia relegated women to the 
status of “weakest link,” in that their sexuality held the most disproportionately severe 
repercussions for the Soviet family and society. The Bolshevik notion of gender equality, 
then, became strained and threatened to snap in this period. Thus, this study reflects the 
                                                                
Texas A&M University Press, 1999); Isaac J. Tarasulo, Gorbachev and Glasnost: Viewpoints from the 
Soviet Press (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1989); Elena Androunas, Soviet Media in Transition: Structural 
and Economic Alternatives (Westport: Praeger, 1993). 
3 Tarasulo, Gorbachev and Glasnost, xviii. 
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limited potential of glasnost to liberalize the Soviet intelligentsia’s social and cultural 
values, and concludes that there was a greater degree of continuity in the way 
intellectuals conceptualized sex and sexuality over the course of seventy years than 
ideological departure in the glasnost period. It further reveals the limits of glasnost more 
generally, challenging the notion that conservatism was exclusively a top-down 
phenomenon in the Soviet Union, even by the end of its existence. 
Perestroika and Glasnost 
 In 1985, shortly after becoming the Soviet Union’s final General Secretary, 
Mikhail Gorbachev delivered a speech to Communist Party activists in which he said 
aloud what had been widely known for many decades: the Soviet economy had failed to 
provide a “first world” standard of living for its citizens, and production output and 
commerce was only getting worse. Several months later, Gorbachev introduced the 
perestroika (rebuilding or restructuring) reform policies at the 27th Congress of the 
Communist Party. Perestroika was designed with the Soviet Union’s long history of 
economic malaise in mind. However, Gorbachev’s reforms were aimed at all facets of 
Soviet society, as he recognized the problem was not purely economic, but brought about 
by decades of mounting political corruption and social alienation, as well as a steady 
decline of Soviet ideological and moral values.4  
 Gorbachev’s holistic approach to reform was buttressed by glasnost (referring to 
the quality of openness or transparency), a corresponding reform policy which decreased 
official censorship and allowed for freer public discourse. According to communications 
scholar Elena Androunas, Gorbachev initially had a rather contrived conceptualization of 
                                                                
4 Padma Desai, Perestroika in Perspective: The Design and Dilemma of Soviet Reform (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), 3. 
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glasnost, in that it was not meant to lead to widespread challenges of socialism or the 
Soviet system, but was instead meant to be an instrument in Gorbachev’s policy of 
“improving socialism.”5 Gorbachev makes this point himself in a short chapter of his 
1987 book, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World. The chapter, 
titled “More Light to Glasnost!,” follows the trajectory of the rest of the book,  in that 
glasnost is limited to that which would improve the existing system without presenting 
fundamental challenges. “Beware! Glasnost is aimed at strengthening our society. And 
we have a lot to assert,” writes Gorbachev.6 The limitations of glasnost are paramount to 
recognize the context in which discourses on sex took place.  
Thus, glasnost was not envisioned as “freedom of speech” in the western sense. 
Instead, Gorbachev aimed to remedy seven decades’ worth of political, economic, and 
bureaucratic complacency, brought about by a lack of oversight. An alternative analysis 
suggests that the Party’s control over media and mass communications was breaking 
down by the late 1980s due to increased globalization and technological innovation.7 This 
explanation proposes that Gorbachev was pushed into glasnost. According to media and 
communications specialist Brian McNair, Gorbachev instituted glasnost largely because 
he recognized that the global information revolution would bring unregulated and 
questionable discourse within Soviet borders, as was the case with the spread of 
unfettered information following the Chernobyl crisis.8 Thus, Gorbachev’s ultimate goal 
with glasnost was to maintain a degree of control over a seemingly inevitable process. 
                                                                
5 Androunas, Soviet Media in Transition, 2. 
6 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1987), 65.  
7 Brian McNair, Glasnost, Perestroika, and the Soviet Media (London: Routledge, 1991), 2. 
8 Ibid. 
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Alternatively, diplomatic historian Robert English suggests that Gorbachev’s penchant 
for liberal reform was undercut by the need to placate Party hardliners.9 According to 
English’s argument, Gorbachev was only able to make incremental changes, rather than 
transform the system wholesale. In either case, perestroika and glasnost were not policies 
which aimed to transform the system, a point Gorbachev reiterated several times in his 
book and in public speeches. They were envisioned and designed to enhance an existing 
social, moral, political, and economic system, which had been perpetuated by hardliners, 
to fit the needs and challenges of globalization in the late 1980s. 
The limitations of glasnost as a period of liberalization can be better understood 
when juxtaposed with another purportedly liberal period in Soviet history, the 
Khrushchev-era “Thaw.” Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech,” or his denouncement of 
Stalinist coercion, given to the Party activists at the 20th Congress of the Communist 
Party in 1956, along with his release of hundreds of thousands of Gulag prisoners 
between 1953 and 1960, have cemented his place in history as a reformer. However, 
historian Miriam Dobson has challenged the idea of a social and political “binary,” in 
which political leaders clung exclusively to conservatism or reformism.10 Khrushchev 
instituted crackdowns against crime and recidivism, and significantly complicated Gulag 
returnees’ reintegration into society. Additionally, Dobson highlights the central role 
ordinary citizens played in renegotiating the terms of the post-Stalinist Soviet Union, and 
their resistance to accepting widespread amnesty for Gulag returnees. Similarly, citizens 
in the Gorbachev period played a vital role in perestroika, and in fact, their cooperation 
                                                                
9 Robert English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the 
Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 193-5. 
10 Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime and the Fate of Reform 
after Stalin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 15. 
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was of paramount importance in the policy’s success. Both Khrushchev and Gorbachev 
faced the seemingly irresolvable puzzle of trying to reform the system without 
undermining the proclaimed infallibility of Bolshevik ideology. Additionally, ordinary 
people in both the Khrushchev and the Gorbachev period tended toward conservatism, 
independent of top-down influence. The comparison further highlights the circumspect 
nature of glasnost as a reform policy, and challenges the idea of the disenfranchised 
Soviet citizen. In fact, during glasnost it was Soviet citizens, filmmakers and journalists, 
who resisted social liberalization.  
Sexuality and Soviet Morality 
Discourses on sex in the glasnost period reflect the complexity of Soviets’ 
problemized history of conceptualizing human sexuality, which presented Bolshevik 
ideology with one of its fundamental paradoxes. On the one hand, sexual harmony was a 
central principle of the socialist utopian idea. On the other hand, sexuality separate from 
procreation represented, in the words of prominent Soviet sexologist Igor Kon, “the 
irrational, individualistic, capricious, and spontaneous. All things anti-Bolshevik.”11 
However, few members of the intelligentsia suggesting that “free love,” or the idea of 
love and sex separate from the patriarchal nuclear family, was a piece of the utopian 
puzzle. Ultimately, this conservatism in a period of relative journalistic and creative 
freedom is a result of Soviets’ historical legacy of sexual conservatism.  
Early Soviets’ ideals of “free love” stemmed from a wider nineteenth-century 
philosophical trend. Late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Russian philosophers, 
such as Vladimir Solov’ev (1853-1900), Nikolai Berdiaev (1874-1948) and Nikolai 
                                                                
11 Igor S. Kon, The Sexual Revolution in Russia: From the Age of the Czars to Today (New York: 
The Free Press, 1995), 2. 
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Fedorov (1829-1903), suggested that humans were fundamentally unique from other 
animals in their ability to connect with the divine. Solov’ev contended that man existed 
on three levels – natural, social, and divine – and that only when man could transcend the 
procreative instinct and infuse sexuality with his divine nature, could sexuality reach its 
utopian potential.12 Yet even in pre-Soviet Russia, the intelligentsia’s propensity to favor 
communal society inspired unease about nonprocreative sexual relations, which were 
thought to be “insufficiently communal.”13 The intelligentsia value of communal society 
was emboldened by Bolshevik collective ideology, and so was the anxiety surrounding 
sexual relations. 
 The notion that early Bolsheviks widely embraced “free love” is not entirely 
accurate, and does not illustrate the complexity of how Bolsheviks conceptualized 
sexuality in the 1920s. Vladimir Lenin, for example, held far more restrictive views on 
sexuality than the fathers of communism, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Lenin’s 
primary occupation was ultimately revolution, and while he condemned religious 
asceticism, he viewed energies expended on sex as distracting to the revolutionary 
struggle.14 Early Bolsheviks’ ideas about sex, then, were never as liberated as were those 
of their ideological forefathers’. Bolsheviks’ convoluted notions about sex and sexuality 
promoted a sense of apprehension about sex and its social and cultural contexts in the 
first decade of Soviet rule. According to literary scholar Eric Naiman, 1920s discourses 
about sex revealed anxieties about the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which 
                                                                
12 Eric Naiman, Sex in Public: The incarnation of early Soviet ideology (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), 28-30. 
13 Ibid, 31. 
14 Kon, Sexual Revolution, 53. 
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essentially stipulated a postponement of utopia.15 Naiman writes, “Sex may act as 
symbolic shorthand for all forms of contamination feared by mentalities that produce 
utopian texts.”16 Censure for NEP took on the form of sexual metaphor in Marxist 
literature during the 1920s. Thereby, the glasnost-era adoption of sex as a discursive 
proxy for tenuous social, political, and economic predicaments finds its roots in another 
period commonly thought to be sexually progressive, the Soviet 1920s.  
 Examining early Bolsheviks’ problemized conceptualization of sex and sexuality 
suggests that Joseph Stalin’s 1930s turn away from “free love” and toward a more 
restricted, procreative model of sexuality was not so extreme an ideological deviation. 
Stalin’s measures ultimately aligned with Lenin’s view of nonprocreative sex as 
disruptive. Thus, measures such as the criminalization of homosexuality in 1933 and the 
ban on abortion in 1936 were justified by appealing to the revolutionary logic, in that 
nonprocreative sexual activity was labeled a product of capitalist decadence, and a 
symptom of hedonism that was strictly anti-collectivist.17 Kon argues that official 
“sexophobia” became the standard ideology in the early 1930s, as nineteenth-century 
intellectuals were gradually replaced with a more conservative nomenklatura.18 However, 
while sexophobia may be viewed as a retreat from Marxist “free love,” it reflects the fact 
that Bolshevik leaders, and the Soviet public, were never completely comfortable with 
the idea of nonreproductive sexuality. 
 Unlike his predecessor, Lenin, who viewed sex as merely disruptive, Stalin placed 
sex and sexuality squarely within the perimeters of Soviet morality. Stalin tasked the 
                                                                
15 Naiman, Sex in Public, 7-12. 
16 Ibid, 16. 
17 Kon, Sexual Revolution, 71-9. 
18 Ibid, 82. 
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Soviet school system to create a qualified curriculum of sex education that was 
synonymous with moral education.19 According to this restrictive model, sexuality was 
denied a discrete existence and was acknowledged only as a necessary aspect of Soviet 
morality, in that procreative sex was necessary for the proliferation of a bright communist 
future. Those who fornicated, then, could stand accused of anti-collectivism.  
The Khrushchev-era “Thaw” mitigated some of the more extreme notions of 
treason associated with nonprocreative sex during Stalinism. Officially, however, 
sexuality remained restricted to the context of domestic duty. Khrushchev laid out a 
moral rulebook at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party in October 1961 called the 
Moral Code of the Builder of Communism. The code’s simplified twelve-point format 
was a call to arms against antisocial, and more importantly, anti-collectivist behaviors.20  
While the mention of sexuality was not explicitly written into the moral code’s all-
inclusive points, historian Deborah A. Field points out that Khrushchev’s morality drive 
aimed to eliminate sex outside of marriage as a dangerous, antisocial behavior that led to 
the birth of children who shared their parents’ moral weakness.21  
Sexuality continued to be officially linked to morality in the 1960s and 70s. Yet, 
the birth of Soviet medical sexology, called “sexopathology,” represented a progressive 
step, in that the official silence around sex was finally eased. However, this “progressive” 
move proved to be quite limited in scope. Kon argues that the establishment of 
sexopathology was an attempt to bring sexuality under medical control without also 
                                                                
19 Lynne Attwood, The New Soviet Man and Woman: Sex-Role Socialization in the USSR 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 184-5. 
20 Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 211. 
21 Deborah A. Field, Private Life and Communist Morality in Khrushchev's Russia (New York: 
Peter Lang, 2007), 52. 
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establishing it as a pedagogical discipline.22 Thus, even medical professionals who 
treated issues related to sex or sexuality received practically no training in sexuality per 
se.  
Because sex was circumscribed to a moral context for nearly the entirety of the 
Soviet experiment, the “sexual revolution” that began in the mass media and cinema in 
1987 proved to be far less radical than it at first appeared, and actually reflects a 
continuity of restrictions typical of the Soviet period as a whole. Relatedly, public 
discourse about sex was long associated with social and moral concerns. As Naiman 
notes, erotic literature and art of the 1920s mirrored concerns about NEP and other socio-
political changes that came with the Bolshevik Revolution. Even the evolution of medical 
sexology in the 1960s and 70s did not connote a more liberalized public discourse about 
sexuality. The term “sexopathology” denotes the problemized conceptualization of sex in 
Stagnation-era public discourse, insofar as normative sexuality did not require public 
acknowledgement.  
The comparatively permissive discourse about sex and sexuality in the 1980s, 
then, can be interpreted not as a “sexual revolution,” but as an explosion in social and 
moral anxiety about the Soviet way of life. As Kon notes, the discourses of the glasnost 
era did not entail the heralding of a “sophisticated sexual-erotic culture.”23 Even decadent 
sex scenes in glasnost-era chernukha (filthy) films echoed concerns about the social and 
moral status of the Soviet family in the tenuous period of perestroika. Soviet intellectuals 
were ill prepared to appreciate and examine sexuality separate from a problemized moral 
context. On the other hand, there was significant precedent in utilizing sex discourse as a 
                                                                
22 Kon, Sexual Revolution, 91. 
23 Ibid, 271. 
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proxy to proclaim social and moral anxieties in the 1920s, followed by several decades of 
officially imposed sexophobic silence. Both phenomena reflect sexually conservative 
ideologies, sustained in the glasnost period by filmmakers and journalists. Ironically, it 
would seem, a reform movement strengthened reactionary impulses when it came to 
sexuality. 
Emancipating Women? 
Soviet conceptualizations of gender and sexuality were inextricably linked. 
Glasnost-era filmmakers’ and journalists’ discourses about sex were disproportionately 
focused on women as moral bastions of the Soviet family. In this way, glasnost-era 
intellectuals were following the legacy of past Soviet thinkers, who debated the limits of 
women’s emancipation, and decisively concluded that it could not include a sexual 
component.  While the sexuality of men had been deliberated by Russian nineteenth-
century philosophers such as Vladimir Solov’ev, the Bolsheviks were the first to publicly 
debate women’s sexuality. According to historian Barbara Engel, the “woman question” 
of the nineteenth century, which primarily revolved around education and labor, was 
augmented to embrace women’s sexuality as a public concern in the 1920s. She writes, 
“In response to the increasing number of women who penetrated into public and 
previously male space, women’s bodies became part of the terrain over which educated 
society struggled for power.”24  
Ultimately, however, women’s sexuality separate from motherhood was never 
widely acknowledged, even in the 1920s. Arguably the most well-known female 
revolutionary, Alexandra Kollontai, was never successful in her effort to popularize “free 
                                                                
24 Barbara A. Engel, Women in Russia, 1700-2000 (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 117. 
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love,” and demolish the traditional family, which she argued restrained women from 
achieving their capacity for self-sacrifice and self-abnegation on a revolutionary scale.25  
Revolutionary posters of the 1920s represented healthy female sexuality as synonymous 
with reproduction, by depicting vibrant young women surrounded by young children.26  
While the 1920s were certainly the most sexually permissive period of the Soviet Union 
prior to glasnost, it should be kept in mind that the comparison with the “sexophobia” 
from the 1930s onward has a tendency to emphasize the emancipatory potential of the 
NEP period for women’s sexuality without taking into consideration some of the 
conservative realities. The lack of adherence for women’s sexual emancipation in the 
1920s ultimately set the stage for Stalin-era sexually restrictive policies, which most 
profoundly affected women. The Stalinist reward system for “heroine mothers,” or 
women who gave birth to ten or more living children, left no room for doubt about the 
social value of women’s sexuality.27  
Women’s sexualities were not notably more “emancipated” in the Khrushchev 
era. The full potential of the Thaw was never applied to the question of women’s 
sexuality. The Khrushchev administration rushed to address the demographic crisis, 
caused by the tremendous loss of male life in the Great Patriotic War, by more explicitly 
connecting women’s sexuality with morality and the civic duty of childbirth.28 The 
Khrushchev-era popular press, however, did temporarily suspend its unofficial restriction 
on discussing sexuality in the summer of 1957, during the World Festival of Youth and 
                                                                
25 Ibid, 156. 
26 Ibid, 161. 
27 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in 
the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 163. 
28 Melanie Ilič, “Women in the Khrushchev Era: An Overview,” in Women in the Khrushchev Era, 
ed. Melanie Ilič, Susan E. Reid, and Lynne Attwood (Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 9. 
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Students, a gathering in Moscow of more than 34,000 students from 131 countries. The 
criticism in the media, notably Komsomol’skaia pravda, was highly restrained, because 
the Youth Festival was meant to ease tensions with the West. However, the discourse in 
the popular press about sexual promiscuity provided a preview of the sort of homily that 
would occur extensively in the glasnost-era press, in that the censure was focused 
primarily on young women and western sexual infiltration. Journalists derided “loose 
girls” (devushka legkogo povedeniia), who failed to guard their “maidenly honor” from 
foreign guests.29 This rare example provides insight into the continuity between the late 
1950s and the late 1980s. In both cases, women are tasked with defending sexual 
morality from foreign elements. Failure to do so, then, also falls directly on their 
shoulders. 
Brezhnev-era stagnation further solidified the idea of women as the moral beacon 
of the Soviet family. In the 1970s and early 1980s Soviet society began to more openly 
acknowledge a range of social issues. However, these issues, such as alcoholism and 
disenchantment with the professional realm, were thought to affect mostly men.30 
According to Engel, “For these ills, femininity provided both a cause and cure.”31 That is, 
women who attended to their maternal and domestic duty were viewed as aiding in 
combatting the prevailing societal ills. Women whose ambitions, professional or sexual, 
outstripped their prescribed roles were viewed with contempt. This is evident in the most 
popular film of the stagnation period, Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears (1979), where 
                                                                
29 Kristin Roth-Ey, “‘Loose Girls’ on the Loose? Sex, Propaganda and the 1957 Youth Festival,” 
in Women in the Khrushchev Era, ed. Melanie Ilič, Susan E. Reid, and Lynne Attwood (Houndsmill: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 75-6. 
30 Engel, Women in Russia, 246. 
31 Ibid. 
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protagonist Katerina’s professional success in her role as an executive director at a large 
factory keeps her from connecting with the love of her life, Gosha. Gosha, a talented tool-
and-die maker, is unwilling to compromise his masculinity by accepting a woman who 
outranks him professionally. Only when Katerina is willing to abandon her professional 
career in the name of love does Gosha return, with his masculinity intact. While the film 
leaves inexplicit whether or not Katerina has left her position at the factory, it is her 
willingness to do so in order to rise up to a traditionally feminine role that holds 
significance.  
Intellectuals’ discourses about sex in the glasnost era overwhelmingly revolved 
around concerns for women and family, evidencing conservative continuity. In fact, it 
can be argued that the perestroika era saw recognition for women as autonomous 
sociopolitical actors reduced. Literary scholar Helena Goscilo argues just that in an essay 
titled “Perestroika or Domostroika” (“dom” referencing “home” or the domestic space). 
She notes that journalists’ coverage of women in any given context was decidedly more 
misogynistic when editors were less concerned with meeting the ideological standard for 
“women’s equality” during glasnost. “The majority of Russians, including those trained 
in deciphering the values and political allegiances attaching to ostensibly innocuous 
discourse, seemed impervious to sexist language or strategies,” writes Goscilo, “They 
could not detect the articulation of gender politics in verbal formulations that any 
educated Westerner would find crudely chauvinistic.”32 If women’s increased 
sociopolitical autonomy is a measurement for liberalization, which it often has been, then 
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misogyny in film and the popular press indicates the Soviet Union was moving in the 
other direction in the glasnost years.  
Ultimately, the film and popular press discourses of the transitional years rely on 
an intellectual tradition of steadfastly associating women’s sexuality with reproduction 
and familial (dis)harmony. The fact that the intelligentsia acknowledged women’s 
sexuality separate from the maternal context, by broaching such phenomena as 
prostitution and pornography, does not indicate approval. In fact, extensive coverage of 
women’s sexuality corresponded with a widespread moral panic. The proliferation of 
discourse acknowledging women’s nonreproductive sexualities was unsubtly linked to 
pervasive moral anxiety, as both filmmakers and journalists utilized discursive proxies to 
examine and explain the social ills plaguing Soviets in the last years of the USSR.  
Lastly, gender anxieties in the perestroika period were also characterized by a 
“crisis of masculinity,” or loss of men’s sense of masculinity as fulfilled through 
professional and political pursuits. This “crisis” was first identified in 1970 by 
demographer Boris Urlanis in Literaturnaia gazeta, at the beginning of the so-called 
stagnation period.33 Many scholars, including Elena Zdravomyslova, Anna Temkina, and 
Marina Kiblitskaya, typically ascribe men’s sense of depreciation in this period as 
fundamentally linked to economic malaise, since the Soviet system defined masculinity 
through success in the professional realm. However, it is important to acknowledge that 
men’s sense of crisis was not exclusively tied to their professional and political prowess, 
but also their societal role vis-à-vis women. According to cultural scholar Lynne 
Attwood, men’s failures to be breadwinners were amplified by the relatively new role 
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women had in production, as well as the home.34 In the Soviet period, men were stripped 
of their hegemonic familial dominance and instructed to defer to women in the domestic 
sphere. Thus, their masculinity hinged on the whim of the economy, which proved 
tenuous at best in the late-Soviet period. Attwood writes, “The masculinity of men has 
been damaged by the fact that many of the tasks which once fell to them have been taken 
over by the state or by women.”35 This sense was amplified by women’s purported loss of 
femininity in the late-Soviet period, in that they failed to have enough children to 
replenish the population. For men, it seemed, women were increasingly encroaching on 
their masculine territory in the late Soviet period while shirking their domestic duties. 
Thus, when Gorbachev called for women to return to the domestic sphere en masse in his 
sociopolitical manifesto, stating, “Women no longer have enough time to perform their 
everyday duties at home,” men were emboldened with a sense of confirmation that, 
indeed, women had violated their part of the social contract.36 The misogyny that seeps 
out of glasnost-era journalistic and cultural discourse can then, in part, be seen as 
symptomatic of a the perceived late-Soviet crisis of masculinity.  
Filmmakers – Sexual Revolutionaries or Defenders of Morality?  
 For the majority of the Soviet Union’s history, filmmakers were considered elite 
members of the creative intelligentsia. Cultural scholar George Faraday argues that the 
intelligentsia, those most educated and elevated to the status of “highly cultured,” were 
also implicitly tasked with upholding superior moral standards.37 In 1980, prominent 
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Soviet director Eldar Ryazanov gave a speech before the Filmmakers’ Union where he 
addressed the perceived moral degradation in recent cinema. Among other things, he 
said, “There is only one concern – the state of the people’s soul, their health, their 
stomach, their garb. And if all this does not inspire the artist, what kind of artist is he, 
anyway?”38 Ryazanov’s remark was a stab at a segment of filmmakers of the stagnation 
period who had taken to creating films purely for entertainment’s sake, those perceived as 
abandoning their claim to the status of intellectual, and guardians of public morals.  
The shared notion of moral duty was widespread amongst filmmakers, and was 
bolstered by the Fifth Congress of the Filmmakers’ Union in May 1986, where a 
“revolution” was set into motion.39 The 1986 cinema revolution provided glasnost-era 
filmmakers with notably more autonomy, and constituted the official end to the Party’s 
systematic efforts to utilize film as an ideological platform. Filmmakers utilized their 
newfound freedoms to establish a new aesthetic, chernukha, literally meaning filth or dirt. 
This new mode of film turned up the volume on the seamy aspects of Soviet life. These 
films featured ample doses of violence, drug use, and sex, all depicted in an unsubtly gray 
setting which implied moral and physical destitution. Scholars of Soviet culture and 
history, however, argue that the creative intelligentsia’s moral tradition burned brighter 
than ever in the glasnost period, as filmmakers utilized their new liberties to shock 
audiences into recognizing social issues long censored in film. Literary scholar Seth 
Graham writes, “[one argument] understood chernukha as an exercise in compensatory 
excess designed to call attention to problems that were undeniably real, but hardly 
terminal, beneath which lay the true ideals of the society, ideals that, after an 
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uncomfortable but necessary encounter with ugliness, would reemerge to redeem that 
society.”40 Cultural scholar Eliot Borenstein’s echoes this sentiment, by writing, “The 
sheer negativity of perestroika-era chernukha – the deliberate épatage and the dogged 
depiction of a world full of cynics – distract from the fact that chernukha functioned 
within a profoundly moral context, one that was all the more powerful for not being 
readily apparent.”41 In this framework, then, chernukha can be understood as echoing the 
nineteen-century Russian intelligentsia tradition of intellectuals and artists as moral 
arbiters.42  
It is within this context of moral aversion therapy that filmmakers portrayed sex 
on the silver screen in the glasnost period. Their depictions of prostitution, teen 
pregnancy, abortion, or even Komsomol orgies can no more be analyzed as approbation 
than their concurrent portrayals of drug use, familial abandonment, or violent crime. 
According to film analyst Valeriia Gorlova, “In a normal world, sex would be seen as a 
‘closed topic,’ not fit for the public exhibition. But in a world where everything is turned 
on its head, as it was in the perestroika years, sex became open for public discourse.”43 
Filmmakers steadfastly proclaimed that their intentions were not to exaggerate or 
sensationalize Soviet ills, but to fulfill their intellectual duty of upholding morality in a 
period where they were entrusted with creative autonomy. The twenty-eight-year-old 
director of the most well-known chernukha feature, Little Vera (1988), reportedly stated, 
“For a long time people have lived trying not to see the world around them. My film has 
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angered and upset them and they ask: How could you show this? But I’m not from Mars 
or America…I grew up in this system, am a product of it, a man from this country, and 
these are my reflections.”44 Ultimately, there is little to no evidence to suggest that 
filmmakers abandoned their sense of moral mission and adopted sensationalism in the 
glasnost period. Their 1986 revolution was aimed, in part, at restoring moral integrity to 
the film medium and steering away from the western notion of creating films “just 
because,” or simply for entertainment.45 
Furthermore, glasnost-era filmmakers’ celluloid discourses on sex are 
fundamentally misogynistic, in that they implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, punish 
sexually active female characters. Moreover, female sexuality frequently acts as the 
catalyst to familial discord and destruction. It can be said that women’s sexual activities 
in chernukha disproportionately lead to instances of death and destitution in a way that 
male sexuality does not. Even in their portrayals of seemingly “sexually emancipated” 
women, filmmakers insert profound anxieties about the fragile nature of the Soviet moral 
and social order.  
The Popular Press 
 The popular press was the intended and primary target of glasnost.46 Examining 
newspapers and journals provides arguably the most diverse, while still admittedly 
contrived, portraits of Soviet discourse in the perestroika years. According to 
communications scholar Mary Dejevsky, the style and format of the popular press 
changed dramatically following glasnost, and upon Gorbachev’s call to action in his 
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Perestroika volume, the Soviet public was brought into the discursive fold in 
“roundtable” discussions and increased numbers of editorial letters and professional 
correspondent discourses.47 This new journalistic diversity was supplemented by a 
relaxation in the editorial process. Tarasulo notes that, “Under glasnost, Soviet 
newspapers and magazines have developed into semi-autonomous bodies.”48 This new 
style, along with the dynamic sociopolitical milieu of the perestroika years, led to an 
exponential rise in the circulation of daily newspapers, literary journals, and sociological 
pamphlets. Papers like Izvestiia, Sovetskaia kul’tura, and Pravda all saw their circulation 
skyrocket in the perestroika era. Argumenty i fakty, a relative unknown before glasnost, 
gained a readership of around 23 million by 1989.49 It is fair, then, to conclude that the 
popular press became a “national obsession” in the perestroika period.50 
 Scholars generally view the glasnost years as a unique period for the Soviet press 
because of fewer official restrictions, increased readership, and the novel roundtable 
format. Additionally, the popular press is seen as having very quickly supplanted 
Gorbachev’s circumscribed definition of “criticism” in the months after glasnost was 
made a reality. Tarasulo writes, “All attempts to define the limits of glasnost have failed. 
It has taken on a momentum of its own, becoming a powerful modernizing force in an 
outdated an oppressive political system.”51 Communications scholar Joseph Gibbs echoes 
this sentiment, noting, “Glasnost had pushed factionalism into the open, destroying the 
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monolithic image cultivated by the CPSU since the early 1920s.”52 These views reinforce 
the idea of Soviet history as disjointed: before glasnost and after glasnost, and ultimately 
conclude that glasnost was a disruptive policy to a hegemonic system.  
 Yet such a notion does not capture the complexity of the popular press during the 
perestroika period. Anthropologist Aleksi Yurchak argues against the idea of the late 
Soviet period as a binary, in which the elite nomenklatura ruled through coercion and the 
rest of the public had little to no agency.53 Scholarship which views the popular press as 
discrete from the Soviet regime, and driven by wholly separate interests, ultimately 
undermines the interconnected nature of the system. “Everyone was to some extent 
complicit in the system of patronage, lying, theft, hedging, and duplicity through which 
the system operated.”54 Thus, it is inaccurate to cast Soviet political leaders and 
journalists as diametrically opposed interest groups in the glasnost period. 
 Like filmmakers, journalists, overall, remained willingly loyal to social and moral 
conservatism. According to Borenstein, the Soviet media followed the wave of 
chernukha, in that their journalistic discourses in the glasnost period were a form of 
“muckracking,” situated within a higher moral and social purpose.55 Journalists utilized 
glasnost to tackle social issues they perceived in society, and yet they did so within the 
context of a circumscribed, morally-driven rulebook. Discourse about sex existed in its 
most prolific form in response to the wave of explicit sex in popular cinema and in 
pornography. In this realm, journalists expressed nearly universal condemnation. 
However, the most revealing indication that journalists remained conservative in regards 
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to sex and sexuality was their widespread resistance to expand the definition of normative 
sexuality away from the strictly heterosexual, marital context. Their steadfast adherence 
to sexual conservatism, and their discourses on how sexual deviance could lead to 
domestic, social, and economic decay, reveals continuity with the conceptualization of 
sexuality in the Soviet period as a whole. The most apparent continuity is the idea that 
nonreproductive sexuality had the potential to be disruptive to the revolutionary mission, 
which for men included excellence in the professional and political spheres, and for 
women meant mastery of the domestic and familial domains. Moreover, this continuity 
presents a fundamental challenge to a binary view of Soviet history, where “the state” 
enforced social and moral codes through coercion and the public meekly complied.  
Overview 
This thesis is ultimately a narrative about intellectuals: filmmakers and 
journalists. I analyze how they approached, utilized, and portrayed sex and sexuality in 
their respective mediums, cinema and the popular press, and what their discourses 
ultimately tell us about the social, political, and moral concerns of the perestroika and 
glasnost era. Examining their productions, which were created with comparative 
autonomy in relation to the Soviet past, reveals conservative attitudes that transcend the 
notion of top-down coercion, and challenges a binary view of Soviet history.  
Their discourses on sexuality and morality are especially revealing because the 
Russian, and then Soviet, intelligentsia was traditionally entrusted with strengthening the 
moral fiber of the public, a role most intellectuals felt obliged to fulfill. Faraday 
concludes about the intellectuals of the late-Soviet period, “For an educated person to 
refuse to assume any kind of responsibility to society would imply forgoing his or her 
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claim to the positively valorized status of intellectual.”56 Ultimately, then, the 
intelligentsia was beholden to embody the highest moral values, which may or may not 
have aligned with Soviet ideology at any particular time.  
As an examination of discourse, this study does not seek to evaluate Soviets’ 
actual sexual behaviors and trends in the glasnost period. In fact, it is worth noting the 
disparity between intellectuals’ discursive conservatism and Soviets’ real behaviors in 
regards to sexuality in the last years of the USSR. Glasnost was a period in which the rate 
of sexual violence, teen sex, and abortion increased by nearly a third.57 While the reality 
of actual behavioral patterns does not necessarily align with discourse in the case of sex 
in this period, the difference between ideology and practice further illustrates the 
overarching theme of this study: that Soviets acted with varying degrees of sociopolitical 
autonomy, whether they were reinforcing the Party line or acting against it.  
Chapter 1 examines glasnost-era films of varying style and popularity, which all 
fall under the chernukha aesthetic, and each feature explicit sex scenes. Chernukha was 
the dominant trend in Soviet film from 1987 to the end of the USSR. It broke new ground 
in that filmmakers put on display the seamy aspects of Soviet life never before expressly 
depicted. Whether they were “airing dirty laundry,” or indulging in artistic excess after a 
cultural draught, their onscreen discourses reflect notions that existed within filmmakers’ 
artistic vision, and thus reproduced a perception of life that was undeniably Soviet. I 
examine nine films from the chernukha cycle, released between 1988 and 1991, of 
varying target audiences and styles. The selection includes detektiv (detective), drama, 
and films from the burgeoning coming-of-age genre. Likewise, I analyze films that 
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topped the box office and those that received miniscule viewership. Despite the diversity 
of the selection, each film was debated in the Soviet cultural press during the glasnost 
period, and singled out as reflective of the wider aesthetic trend.  
I argue that onscreen sex in the glasnost years existed within a misogynistic 
framework which revealed a moral crisis about the state of the Soviet family, social 
structure, and the domestic sphere.  By portraying sex in a profoundly negative light, 
filmmakers embraced conservative ideas about sex and women in chernukha to 
communicate concerns distinct to the perestroika era. Their artistic “parade of horribles” 
indicts women’s sexualities directly, and links them to ostensible consequences onscreen. 
Thus, this chapter suggests that the sex and sexuality portrayed in this selection of films 
is reflective not of filmmakers’ sense of sexual permissiveness, but of their endured 
conservatism.  
Chapter 2 examines the glasnost-era popular press, and the discourses on sex 
which occurred within the pages of newspapers and journals. The print sources represent 
the popular press broadly, and include dailies such as Pravda, Izvestiia, and Argumenty i 
fakty, as well as cultural reviews like Sovetskaia kul’tura, and satirical journals like 
Krokodil. These sources prove especially valuable to this analysis, as they represent 
journalists as intellectuals with a moral mission and journalists as the primary targets of 
Gorbachev’s glasnost policy. My examination reveals that journalist, as well as the 
experts and letter-writers they featured, generally expressed conservatism about 
sexuality, especially women’s sexuality. As with filmmakers, their main premise in 
regards to sex was connecting sexual permissiveness with perceived degradation of social 
and moral values.  
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Examining these discursive tools together adds breadth to an analysis of this kind, 
allowing for a more robust understanding of both how filmmakers and journalists defined 
sexuality in social and moral contexts and how they voiced their concerns. Cinema and 
the popular press had a symbiotic relationship during the glasnost years. While film 
frequently masked societal commentary with plot, characters, setting, or other artistic 
devices, the popular press utilized film as a pretext to address moral and social concerns, 
such as violence and sex. 
 The concluding chapter is an epilogue which briefly considers post-Soviet 
discourses on sex, especially in the last ten years. While many twenty-first century 
Russian journalists and cultural producers have veered away from frank depictions of 
social issues, sex as a theme has grown to encompass a dominant role in contemporary 
discourse. Moreover, these depictions continue to be characterized by blatant misogyny. 
Contextualizing modern discourses on sex proves to be problematic, as the social, 
political, and economic changes in Russia over the last quarter century have thrown 
concepts of family, gender, and sexuality into disarray. In fact, it is difficult to conclude 
whether journalists and cultural producers of the twenty-first century continue to 
represent the intelligentsia class, or whether the class still exists. However, one 
overarching concept remains intact from the Soviet to the post-Soviet period: the 
expansion of visible sexuality does not necessarily correlate with a more egalitarian 
society.  
 Ultimately, the evidence suggests that intellectuals in the glasnost period did not 
see themselves as sexual revolutionaries, but as the moral vanguard of the Soviet Union. 
Their discourses on sex, then, must be analyzed within this context. Although their 
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prolific use of sexuality within journalistic and cultural productions initially seems 
contradictory, in-depth analysis suggests that they deemed drastic circumstances were 
necessary in forewarning Soviets about the consequences of an ostensibly new sexual 
permissiveness. Filmmakers and journalists elected to depict or describe in graphic form 
their social and moral anxieties by utilizing sex as a discursive proxy in a parade of 
horribles.  
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CHAPTER 1 – AVERSION THERAPY: SEX AS CULTURAL CONSERVATISM IN 
CINEMA 
By no means was the glasnost era a golden age for Soviet cinema. Filmmakers 
were openly discussing the “death of national cinema” by 1989.58 In the late 1960s and 
early 1970, the Soviet cinema industry rivaled Hollywood by producing almost 150 
feature films annually. That number had withered to around a dozen domestically-
produced full-length films in 1988 and 1989 respectively.59 The film industry was in such 
an abysmal position by 1989, that there exist few reliable box office figures for the two 
subsequent years. In large part, film critics attributed the decline of Soviet cinema to 
filmmakers’ newly adopted permissiveness in displaying sex onscreen.60 Explicit sex was 
discussed as the primary negative trend within the larger film aesthetic, chernukha 
(literally meaning dark stuff), which aimed to expose the long-censored “seamy” side of 
Soviet society. Indeed, the relatively few films produced in the glasnost years utilized 
onscreen sex for the first time. Especially notable was the regular display of women’s 
sexuality and nudity.  
This chapter explores portrayals of female heterosexual sexualities in cinema and 
how they related to filmmakers’ anxieties about the moral and social state of the Soviet 
Union during the perestroika and glasnost period. Misogyny emerges as an essential 
characteristic of a moral crisis expressed by filmmakers during the glasnost years. In their 
films, fear of women’s sexual emancipation penetrates as deeply as concerns for the 
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continued existence of the Soviet moral and social order. I conclude that in the final years 
of the Soviet Union one of the primary characteristics of intellectuals’ (in this case 
filmmakers’) moral crisis included a misogynistic framework.   
Briefly examining the production of films in the glasnost years promotes a more 
nuanced context in which to place filmmakers’ onscreen misogyny. This time period is 
unique, and as with many phenomena in the perestroika years, the cinema industry was in 
a state of flux.  Misogyny, however, is a central characteristic of this period’s aesthetic in 
the face of both continuities and an emerging crisis, as the subsequent analysis reflects. 
Although filmmakers enjoyed a higher degree of autonomy after the 1986 cinema 
“revolution,” virtually all those creating films in the glasnost period were graduates of the 
oldest film school in the world, the Gerasimov Institute of Cinematography (VGIK). 
They were also subject to the same rules and restrictions of Soviet filmmaking until the 
fateful Fifth Congress of the Filmmakers’ Union meeting in May 1986, which began the 
deconstruction of the Soviet cinema monolith.61 Thus, there is a model that most 
filmmakers in the period immediately following the Union meeting still fell into, in terms 
of education, production, and bureaucracy. Despite these similarities, however, the films 
analyzed in this chapter were created by filmmakers from multiple generations, who 
embraced various definitions of art, culture, and cinema.  
It is not the mere presence of sex and nudity in glasnost-era film that suggest an 
overt sexism. Instead, it is often the subtext and the nature of sex that points to this 
conclusion. As Graham notes on glasnost-era film, “Sex is represented most often as 
rape, though rarely acknowledged as such. Female nudity is common, and often signals 
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the imminence of a rape scene.”62 Previous scholarship has aimed to contextualize the 
chernukha mode in a cultural context, suggesting that chernukha was a combination of 
culturally representative responses and filmmakers’ internal sentiments. Cultural scholar 
Liudmilla Budiak’s analysis of the state of Soviet cinema in 1990 suggested that 
filmmakers were preoccupied with basking in their new artistic freedoms by amplifying 
the seamy aspects of life that had been previously censored, and that their glasnost-era 
works cannot be held up as culturally representative.63 This conclusion corresponds to 
what scholars have evaluated as late-Soviet filmmakers’ propensity to “create films for 
themselves.”64  However, such analysis proposes that there was some degree of validity 
in filmmakers’ glasnost-era social commentaries, even if they happened to be amplified 
or exaggerated. They “turned up the volume,” so to speak, on the negative aspects of 
Soviet living. The harshest critics of the trend commonly accused chernukha filmmakers 
of inverting socialist realism, the state’s official film aesthetic that painted an idealist 
picture of Soviet life.65 One of the most vocal proponents of this view was film critic 
Sergei Dobrotvorskii, who denied that chernukha held any cultural capital in the 
perestroika years within several issues of Iskusstvo Kino (Cinematic Art), the leading film 
periodical.66 
However, other scholars argue that chernukha film carried a significant degree of 
cultural and moral capital in a tumultuous perestroika period. Faraday examines the 
relationship between late-Soviet filmmakers’ sense of creative mission and a broader 
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pattern of social consciousness characteristic of the Soviet intelligentsia, finding that 
Soviet filmmakers, along with other cultural producers, felt a sense of responsibility to 
uphold moral superiority.67 Rather than dissipating during the glasnost era, this prevalent 
sense of purpose was bolstered by filmmakers’ renewed vigor following the “cinematic 
revolution.” According to Borenstein, this turn of events imbued glasnost-era filmmakers 
with renewed tenacity, and a drive to create “muckracking” films which exposed the 
darker, hidden aspects of Soviet life.68 Such analyses suggest that glasnost-era 
filmmakers imbued films with a sense of civic, and indeed moral, duty.  
Examining a film cannot definitively answer whether filmmakers were projecting 
their own misogyny or if they were reproducing their social experiences onscreen. 
However, repeated instances of sexism in glasnost-era films do reveal a wider pattern in 
the chernukha aesthetic, suggesting that the dominant means of expressing womanhood 
or relating to women existed within a misogynistic framework. While Faraday states that, 
“the key characteristic that united the works of the chernukha genre was the unrelenting 
hopeless picture of life they presented,” filmmakers disproportionately held women 
responsible for these deplorable circumstances.69 Misogynistic tendencies manifested 
themselves through general trends in the chernukha genre. These include the portrayal of 
women as incidental or secondary characters, casting women as the catalysts of familial 
dysfunction, and denying female characters the opportunity for resolution or redemption 
typically afforded to male characters. While these broad trends apply to the spectrum of 
women and womanhood depictions in glasnost-era cinema, I single out sexuality for 
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individual scrutiny. This reveals filmmakers’ fear of women’s sexual emancipation was 
the foremost concern in regards to misogyny in glasnost-era cinema. Women’s sexualities 
are depicted as inextricably linked to dysfunctional families, youth idleness, and moral 
corruption in these films, thus suggesting that women’s sexual permissiveness was the 
fundamental component of societal degradation.  
The Incidental Woman Paradigm 
 Scholars have examined the “women as incidental/secondary figures” trope in 
glasnost-era cinema. Cultural scholars Andrew Horton and Michael Brashinsky attribute 
this incidentalization to the absence of a clearly delineated contemporary feminist 
movement during the late-Soviet period.70 Attwood has argued that with women’s 
reorientation towards the domestic sphere under Gorbachev, and a lack of a “women’s 
genre of film” during the same period, there existed a propensity to marginalize women 
in film.71 Most academic interpretations of women’s secondary status in glasnost-era film 
rely on the explanation of external forces such as the “return to the home” trend or the 
lack of a western-style feminist movement during the glasnost years. Additionally, 
scholars have attributed women’s marginalization as the product of very few women 
working within the film industry, itself probably a symptom of Soviet sexism. According 
to literary scholar Barbara Heldt’s analysis of women in film and literature during the 
glasnost period, “Women have most often been spoken and written for by men.”72 Rather 
than presuming that the onscreen marginalization of women was a result of women’s 
                                                                
70 Andrew Horton and Michael Brashinsky. The Zero Hour: Glasnost and Soviet Cinema in 
Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 100. 
71 Lynne Attwood, “Sex and the Soviet Cinema,” in Sex and Soviet Society, ed. Igor S. Kon and 
James Riordan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 74.  
72 Barbara Heldt, “Gynoglasnost: Writing the Feminine,” in Perestroika and Soviet Women, ed. 
Mary Buckley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 160. 
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absence in the production of glasnost-era cinema, I analyze what I term “the incidental 
woman paradigm” as a product of glasnost-era filmmakers’ misogynistic framework, 
most notably characterized by a fear of women’s sexual emancipation. Not only did 
filmmakers portray women as merely incidental or secondary, but their utilization of this 
archetype in concert with their portrayals of sexual violence bestowed a clearly 
subordinate status onto women in many glasnost-era films. This analysis goes beyond 
filmmakers’ “incidentalization” of women, which might be implicit in nature. Instead, the 
analysis suggests an active model of filmmakers’ subordination of women, which was 
unequivocally explicit. Exploring this distinction provides crucial insight into the degree 
of misogyny present in glasnost-era films and cultural productions. 
 Pavel Lungin’s Taxi Blues (1990), a narrative that focuses around an ultra-
masculine, chauvinistic protagonist Ivan and his unexpected and possibly homoerotic 
relationship with drunken musician Aleksi, functions as the primary example of women’s 
marginalization in glasnost-era cinema. As women are relegated to secondary status in 
this film, Ivan’s rare tender moments are reserved exclusively for Aleksi, an alcoholic 
who initially skips out on his cab fare. Ivan’s callous treatment of women is inextricably 
linked to his concern for men in terms of homosocial bonds. As a regular patron of a 
prostitute named Kristina, Ivan takes her to a remote location outside the city to inquire 
about the value of a saxophone he has taken from Aleksi as collateral for the cab fare. 
Upon learning of the substantial value of the instrument, Ivan abandons the prostitute to 
sordid gangsters as he races off to return the expensive saxophone. Ivan’s sense of honor, 
in that he will not appropriate an instrument that far out-values Aleksi’s stiffed cab fare, 
is far more imperative than a woman’s well-being. In fact, returning the instrument is so 
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important that Ivan interrogates and physically assaults Aleksi’s estranged wife, Nina, to 
ascertain the location of the hapless musician. In these two episodes, Taxi Blues not only 
incidentalizes women, but unequivocally relegates them to subordinate status.  
 One particular incident in Lungin’s film further supports this conclusion. This 
episode bonds the incidental woman paradigm to sex and sexual violence, ultimately 
reflecting misogynistic tendencies that revolve around women’s sexualities. Weeks after 
Ivan and Aleksi begin sharing quarters, Ivan brings home a drunken prostitute, Kristina. 
He forces Aleksi to play the saxophone for them while they eat and continue to drink. 
Eventually, Kristiana is drawn to Aleksi over Ivan for his talents and caresses him as he 
plays. Enraged, Ivan rapes the prostitute as Aleksi exits. However, the audience is left 
wondering whose affections the unhinged Ivan truly seeks, Aleksi’s or the young 
woman’s. The sex turns consensual in the next scene and is only interrupted by a phone 
call from Aleksi, who has been arrested for public intoxication. At this, Ivan’s attentions 
immediately shift from Kristina to his alcoholic friend. The scene not only incidentializes 
the sexual assault, but further marginalizes Kristina, whose relevance is suspended for the 
sake of Ivan and Aleksi’s homosocial bond.  
The incidental woman paradigm takes on sexually violent dimensions in several 
other glasnost-era films. Sergei Snezhkin’s An Extraordinary Incident on a Regional 
Scale (1988), a film focusing on a stressful week in the life of First Secretary Nikolai 
Petrovich of the Leningrad Komsomol District Committee, is one such episode. After a 
break-in which leaves the Komsomol headquarters vandalized and missing its regional 
banner, the young, upward-bound Nikolai is slated to take the blame due to bureaucratic 
absurdity. With his professional life in shambles, Nikolai takes his sense of loss and 
 
 
 35  
 
betrayal out on the women around him. Women are not only passive secondary figures, 
but actively the targets of Nikolai’s explosive anger as he struggles to come to terms with 
his lost opportunity to join the nomenklatura. At his breaking point Nikolai calls his wife, 
Galia, and casually demands a divorce. They agree promptly and the phone call ends. 
Nikolai then proceeds to the home of his mistress, Tania, and rapes her without 
discernable provocation or explanation. Cultural scholar Vida Johnson has described the 
rape as one of the most well-motivated sex scenes in glasnost-era cinema, as she 
suggests, “We can observe the political and social impotence of men in a system which 
has systematically stripped them of power: they do to the women what the state has been 
doing to them.”73  This explanation is made all the more meaningful since the scene 
features the voice of Brezhnev on the victim’s television. Nikolai’s attack on Tania may 
be understood as the protagonist transferring the abuses of the state onto women. The 
relationship would then function as “state-man-woman,” relegating women to an 
unmistakably inferior status.74 In Attwood’s words, “Nikolai was really ‘fucking’ the 
system.”75 While Snezhkin’s film certainly charges the Soviet system for the hardship 
that befalls the protagonist, Nikolai abuses women in lieu of retaliating directly. This 
sexual violence indicates that women are distinctly other, and unambiguously secondary, 
in a system that pits man against an abusive Soviet state.   
                                                                
73 Lynne Attwood, Red Women on the Silver Screen: Soviet Women and Cinema from the 
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74 Rather than identifying the state as either masculine or feminine, some scholars have suggested 
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positioning. Zhanna Chernova, “The Model of ‘Soviet’ Fatherhood,” Russian Studies in History 51 no. 2 
(2012): 37.                                                                             
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The 1989 film Assuage My Sorrow, directed by Victor Prokhorov and Alexander 
Alexandrov, offers another portrait of broken masculinity and pits women as the target of 
masculine rage. The film centers around a disintegrating young family, focusing on 
husband and father Boris. Due to the USSR’s chronic housing shortage, Boris is forced to 
continue living with wife Liuba, even as both parties desperately want a divorce. The 
living arrangement often dissolves into vicious verbal and physical entanglements and the 
lines between married couple and singledom are hopelessly blurred. Both husband and 
wife become involved with new partners in the midst of the messy separation. However, 
Boris’s reactions to Liuba’s sexual explorations reveal a double-standard between 
husband and wife. When Boris encounters an intoxicated Liuba returning from a night of 
drinking and flirting, he accosts her at the metro station. Boris calls her a pig and 
physically assaults her in public. Although Liuba is drunk, she reasons, “We are in the 
midst of a divorce. Why do you think you can tell me what to do?” In response, Boris 
grabs her roughly and sexually molests her in plain view of pedestrians, ripping off her 
clothes. A passerby asks if everything is alright, and Boris confidently offers, “Yes, she is 
my wife.” The scene is meaningful in several ways. First, it clearly showcases 
inequalities between men and women. While Boris feels entitled to drink and flirt, Liuba 
is not afforded such liberties. Second, Boris’s sexual attack on Liuba and his 
proclamation of “She is my wife” further evidences his sense of entitlement. The 
bystander’s acceptance of this explanation reveals that the sentiment is not only confined 
to Boris, but is shared by other, reasonable and concerned men in society. Above all else, 
the initially concerned passerby’s acknowledgement of Boris’s privilege to discipline his 
wife demonstrates the sexually violent character of the incidental woman paradigm. After 
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the sexual assault, Liuba follows behind Boris as he walks home, swaying and sobbing. 
She is unsubtly disgraced, as Boris struts tall and unaffected at the forefront. While his 
emotions are dissected throughout the film, Liuba’s state of mind about the divorce and 
the attempted rape remain quite two-dimensional.  
While Snezhkin’s and Prokhorov’s features cast women as incidental and 
secondary figures in a conjugal sense, Savva Kulish’s Tragedy Rock-Style (1989) 
marginalizes the influence of women in the life of teenage track-star-turned-drug-addict 
Viktor (Vitia). Although the film features several female characters, the major figures in 
Vitia’s life remain male. When his father, a respectable member of the nomenklatura, is 
arrested in connection to mafia activity, the previously well-adjusted teenager falls 
instantly into despair. Vitia consequently latches onto the disreputable Cassius, whose 
calculated plan to extort Vitia’s father hinges on pushing Vitia into complete heroin 
addiction. Meanwhile, the women in Vitia’s life, who express a profound concern for his 
wellbeing, are pushed to the sidelines by the disaffected teenager. The primary incidental 
figure is Vitia’s girlfriend Lena. She is deeply infatuated with Vitia, and occupies herself 
with daydreaming about the two of them locked in a passionate embrace. When Vitia 
struggles to cope after his father’s arrest, Lena refuses to leave his side, even as he 
derides her and pushes her away. Eventually, Lena abandons her promising future to 
follow Vitia into heroin addiction. While Vitia seeks escapism to cope with his father’s 
ordeal, Lena follows Vitia into the dark and depraved underground subculture for no 
discernibly authentic reason. Her character functions as an appendage to Vitia, and it is 
not until the two become hooked on drugs that Vitia gains the silence he initially craves 
from Lena. Unlike the women in An Extraordinary Incident and Assuage My Sorrow, 
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Lena is given a degree of autonomy as she actively pursues her love interest into a dark 
abyss. However, the motives are not her own and the plot is only moved by Vitia’s 
emotions and actions. 
Lena is also marginalized in a fundamentally sexual manner, similar to the 
women in the abovementioned films. During Cassius’s regularly sponsored drug-fueled 
orgies, Cassius singles out Lena as his personal victim, raping her countless times 
throughout the film. Unlike the rapes in Taxi Blues and An Extraordinary Incident, we 
are not numb to Lena’s palpable suffering after her assaults. We see Lena cry, scream, 
vomit, squirm, and shake in the aftermath of her rape. Yet even here Lena’s anguish is 
not her own, as each scene splices with a visual of Vitia’s parallel and comparatively 
stoic suffering. In her physical distress, Lena acts as an auxiliary force to Vitia’s 
emotional turmoil.76 The incidental woman paradigm in this film, as within the 
aforementioned, manifests itself most fundamentally when concerning women’s 
sexualities.  
Victor Sergeev’s detective film, The Assassin (1990), provides a unique 
perspective on the “incidental woman paradigm” because the protagonist is, indeed, a 
woman. Yet this film typifies glasnost-era filmmakers’ tendency to cast female characters 
as peripheral even as they act as primary protagonists. Sergeev’s film stars Ol’ga, a well-
off young professional, who returns from a party after being gang-raped by four men. 
Ignoring official channels of justice and the concern of her friends, Ol’ga chooses to seek 
vengeance by hiring a mafia-connected hitman to exact revenge. Initially infused with a 
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large degree of sexual and emotional autonomy, Ol’ga acts thoroughly unaffected by her 
assault and instead plots to humiliate her assailants. We are even given the impression 
that the rape has bolstered Ol’ga’s sexuality as she prances about her apartment in loose 
fitting blouses that threaten to blow away in the wind. However, the scale of power tips 
decidedly against Ol’ga when her hired mercenaries go rogue, gang-raping one of the 
men’s teenager daughters as a form of revenge. Although horrified by the punishment, 
Ol’ga stays resolute and even phones the remaining assailants to inform them of their 
impending fate. When the youngest of her assailants, Andrei, shows up to reason with 
Ol’ga, she quickly falls in love with him in an unlikely turn of events. Ol’ga’s power is 
then inverted as she fails to call off the mercenaries she hires. Her position shifts from 
controlling the situation to becoming another victim on the run. Attwood has likened the 
course of events in The Assassin to Hollywood’s film noir of the 1940s, where female 
characters who challenge male authority are killed or “neutralized” by their romantic 
union with a male hero.77 This case is particularly severe, as Ol’ga is joined to her former 
rapist. Even as Ol’ga serves as the film’s primary protagonist, her reckoning is effectively 
neutralized by what filmmakers dub a more appropriate feminine pursuit, love. 
Women were subject to the incidental woman paradigm in many Soviet films, in 
which males drove the narratives and which utilized female characters as little more than 
animate setting pieces. When it comes to sexual violence in Taxi Blues, An 
Extraordinary Incident, Assuage My Sorrow, Tragedy Rock-Style, and The Assassin, 
however, women are not only secondary figures in a male-focused world, but clearly 
subordinate ones. Subordination, as channeled through sexual violence in these films, 
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shifted how women were portrayed from a model of passive disregard to one of active 
disdain. This mutation signified that, at least in film, women were at the bottom level of 
the “state-man-woman” hierarchy. 
Kto vinovat’?: Women’s Sexuality as a Catalyst for Familial Ruin 
Because women were considered the traditional bearers of Soviet familial virtue 
and stability, it is not surprising that much of glasnost-era filmmakers’ moral crisis 
existed around the idea of women as the catalysts of familial ruin. According to Goscilo, 
“From time immemorial, the dominant Russian iconography has projected nationhood as 
female, its ethos and moral identity metaphorized as maternity.”78 While the Motherland 
(rodina-mat’) paradigm offers a maternal image of nationhood which characterizes 
patriotism and national pride as a celebration of the feminine, so, too, does it fault women 
and womanhood when the inevitable question of “Who is to blame?” (Kto vinovat’?) 
arises. In her analysis of this seemingly double-edged archetype, Attwood concludes, 
“We had repeated examples of female characters being used throughout Soviet history to 
represent Mother Russia and the heights of morality. Now, it seems they are being 
offered as symbols of the Soviet state and its distorted values.”79 Female characters’ 
sexualities, then, act as catalysts to familial ruin in glasnost-era film in two ways. First, a 
daughter’s misguided orientation toward carnal desire destabilizes her 
parents/grandparents and siblings. Second, a mother’s inappropriate or unchecked 
sexuality breaks apart a family either physically or symbolically. While scholars have 
analyzed the misogynistic, paradoxical implications of the feminine national identity 
trope, I further highlight an antipathy to women’s sexualities within it.  
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A daughter’s misguided focus on sexuality spelling destruction for her family can 
be observed in a new genre of film in glasnost aimed at youth. These films, firmly 
situated within the larger chernukha phenomenon, fed on the cultural media’s burgeoning 
fascination with young people’s entanglement with hippy, punk, biker, and criminal 
themes.80 Vasili Pichul’s Little Vera (1988), a film about a disenchanted and rebellious 
eighteen-year-old girl wasting away a summer in a provincial city, proved to be the 
flagship feature of this sub-genre and indeed glasnost-era film more broadly, drawing 
over fifty million viewers.81 Pichul, a twenty-eight year-old first-time filmmaker, also 
proved that a new model of Soviet film, one based on independent cooperatives that 
existed by the grace of their investors, could produce critically acclaimed and financially 
successful features, a new concept for Soviet cinema.82  
The film encapsulates the chernukha aesthetic with its drab, dreary depiction of 
youth and its sardonic title which literary means “little faith” (nothing is lost in the 
translation). Vera spends her days with a motley crew of youths, most involved in some 
sort of illegal activity. The characters in Little Vera fall into apathy, idleness, and 
immorality because of a fundamental lack of opportunity in society. The teenage 
wasteland in Little Vera is defined by drunkenness, hooliganism, and especially sex. 
Teens in the film are cast as losers (neudachniki), and their hedonistic behavior comes at 
the cost of the collective well-being, their families in particular. Vera, who is portrayed as 
a sensual being, fully invested in earthly pleasures, is a fatally flawed character. Her 
sexual transgressions eventually lead to the downfall of her family. Her improvised 
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marriage to a local bad-boy, Sergei, is motivated by Vera’s naïve hope of escaping 
prescribed Soviet dullness. However, Vera gets more than she bargained for when 
tensions between Sergei and her father boil over, leading to a vicious assault on Sergei 
and her father’s untimely death due to a heart attack. Vera’s sin in this film, then, is 
pursuing personal pleasure instead of her family’s wellbeing, primarily by focusing on 
sex. This is a point that is made ironically, as Vera jumps into marriage (a traditionally 
appropriate female pursuit) and even pretends to be pregnant for no discernable reason. 
Vera’s seeming mockery of Soviet domestic life leads to a rupture in her strained family. 
The undisputed runner-up in terms of box office success during the glasnost era 
was Pyotr Todorovsky’s film adaptation (1989) of Vladimir Kunin’s novella Intergirl, 
with forty-one million tickets sold.83 The film, following a Leningrad twenty-three-year-
old nurse by-day and prostitute by-night found widespread success because it featured the 
first cultural portrayal of prostitution in the USSR, a topic already extensively dissected 
by journalists. Apart from her moonlighting, the protagonist Tania appears to be the ideal 
of femininity. Physically, she is traditionally attractive and stylish. Intellectually and 
emotionally, Tania also proves to be an ideal Soviet woman as she dedicates herself to 
her patients and her mother. She also reads romantic Russian poetry in her free time. 
Tania’s exemplary qualities, however, cannot compensate for her deviant sexual activity. 
Like Vera, Tania’s mistake lies in her erroneous assumption that she can utilize her 
sexuality to control her circumstances, a mistake for which she pays dearly. In Intergirl, 
Tania’s deviant sexuality provokes familial destruction in a very literal sense. Her mother 
ultimately commits suicide after rumors of her daughter’s illicit transgressions reach her. 
                                                                
83 “Interdevochka/Intergirl (1989),” Kino-Teatr, accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.kino-
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The disapproval of female sexuality in both Little Vera and Intergirl stem from 
filmmakers’ sense of crisis about the deterioration of the Soviet family. In both cases, the 
heroines’ sexualities go beyond the prescribed bounds of marriage and reproduction, thus 
rupturing their families and eliminating the possibility of a morally-sound future 
generation.  
Additionally, filmmakers tasked mothers with the ultimate moral weight in 
glasnost-era film, utilizing the Motherland (rodina-mat’) paradigm. This folkloric view of 
women and motherhood was emboldened, however, by the Soviet state’s pragmatism. In 
the 1930s, the state concluded that it could not realistically rear children in a truly 
collectivist fashion, and essentially affirmed an uneasy compromise with mothers. 
According to sociologist Ol’ga Issoupova, “The emerging politics [in the 1930s] of 
motherhood was seen as a state function, for which women should be rewarded. Second, 
in line with this, the state was concerned with the quality of future generations. This 
implied women’s bodies were valuable vessels in which the state had a legitimate 
interest.”84 In return, women were given ultimate authority in the domestic realm. This is 
evidenced by the Soviet system’s deconstruction of paternal power and its vitalization of 
the “heroine mother” iconography.85 This arrangement was bolstered by Gorbachev’s 
vow to liberate women from their double burden of professional and domestic obligation, 
allowing them to retreat to the domestic domain to address a demographic crisis.86 The 
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net result of these measures was the thorough construction of women as maternal beings, 
and consequently, the imbuing of mothers with the moral responsibility of the country. 
Glasnost filmmakers’ moral crisis, then, was reasonably expressed through troubled 
motherhood imagery. Thus, women’s sexualities, particularly if those women were 
mothers, were of great concern for filmmakers during glasnost.  
Kulish’s chernukha film Tragedy Rock-Style is one such example where a 
mother’s sexuality is seen as the major destabilizing force for her children. Star student 
and athlete Vitia’s decline into drug-fueled depravity is pinned, in no small part, on his 
absentee mother, who calls him occasionally. He sardonically refers to her as his 
“telephone mother,” and sees images of her nurturing him as a small child as he slips into 
a psychedelic state. Despite his father’s mafia affiliation, and Cassius’s calculated effort 
to hook Vitia on drugs, the truant mother acts as the reservoir of blame, the true source of 
Vitia’s inability to cope. Although the details are deliberately murky, we are left to 
believe that Vitia’s mother left the family to pursue a lover.  
Assuage My Sorrow is sustained almost completely by the destructive mother 
archetype. The film, a grim tale about a couple in the midst of a messy divorce, is more 
fundamentally about a hopelessly broken morality system. For all intents and purposes, 
the wife and mother, Liuba, is held responsible for tearing the family apart. Liuba spends 
her days priming in the mirror in preparation to meet new suitors, a symbol of her vanity 
and general indifference to domestic duties. Her young son, Zhora, wanders about the 
apartment complex with seeming free reign. He engages seedy characters and holds his 
own. We are given the distinct impression that Zhora is headed toward a sordid path, in 
great part because of his mother’s disinterest in raising him. Notably, this disinterest 
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stems from her preoccupation on her own sexuality. On one occasion, Boris rebukes 
Liuba when she reveals she has no idea where young Zhora might be. Her tone is 
thoroughly unconcerned and her gaze never shifts from the mirror in which she prepares 
for another night out with a suitor.  
Liuba’s disinterest in motherhood becomes unsubtly more active as the film 
proceeds. When Boris’s plan to move out fails because of the housing shortage, Boris 
tries one final time to resuscitate the marriage. He prepares a romantic dinner and even 
puts on cologne. Boris and Liuba initially enjoy each other’s company, having sex and 
reminiscing about better times. However, when Boris asks her for one final chance, Liuba 
is thoroughly uninterested. Her refusal is not only a denial of romantic ties, but of her 
familial and moral obligations. At this juncture, Liuba’s impassive attitude regarding her 
maternal duties is replaced with a more definite renouncement. Liuba’s rejection sends 
Boris into a seeming tailspin, and he begins acting carelessly in all aspects of life, even 
raping a young traveler to whom he initially offers lodging for a night.  
One film amalgamates both the maternal and filial destruction mode by utilizing a 
multi-generational approach. Unique from other glasnost-era films which offer women’s 
sexualities as catalysts to familial destruction, Viacheslav Krishtofovich’s theater-
inspired Adam’s Rib (1990) associates women with stagnation rather than wholesale 
destruction. The film, which focuses on three generations of women who share an 
apartment in an unnamed provincial city, seemingly suggests that women are doomed to 
repeat a lonesome existence from one generation to the next.87 The film defies its title, 
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which automatically conjures the image of women as secondary to men (i.e. Eve being 
created from Adam’s Rib), and turns the tables by introducing men as merely transient 
forces in women’s lives (i.e. fathers and husbands). However, Adam’s Rib remains within 
a misogynistic framework which holds women’s sexualities responsible as the source of 
stagnation. Goscilo has argued that glasnost-era films that invert the incidental woman 
trope do so in a way that offers a stagnated picture of female-driven life, one that does not 
hold the same level of intellectual complexity as male-driven narratives.                        
 “One might reasonably object that these works, rather than offering a 
fresh perspective, actually perpetuate the dusty habit of equating women 
with body, reproduction, domesticity, and conservative attitudes. Indeed, 
to some extent they do. Moreover, in troping history along gendered lines, 
they implicitly supply to the imperishable question, ‘Who is to Blame’ 
[Kto vinovat’?] an ominous answer that attributed moral responsibility to 
Russian womanhood.”88  
 
The moral responsibility for stagnation in Adam’s Rib is not only communicated 
through women’s physicality, but primarily via their sexuality. This moral charge rests 
mostly with the middle-aged single mother, Nina, and her daughters, Lidiia and Nastia. 
Throughout the film, Nina is caught in a whirlwind between two ex-husbands and a 
potential lover. Sensing that her time to attract a suitor is limited, and bent on avoiding 
growing old and alone as her mother has, Nina organizes a party (ironically for her 
mother’s name day) and invites all three men in a last-ditch effort to secure one. 
However, Nina’s bombastic attempt to provoke love hinges on the remnants of her sexual 
appeal, which degrade with each passing day. Ultimately, Nina’s hare-brained scheme 
collapses and all three men leave. She is pushed by her waning sexual appeal to sabotage 
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her prospects, once again faced with the likelihood of solitude. Not unsympathetically, 
filmmakers cast Nina as predestined for loneliness because of an insincerity which stems 
from feminine sexuality.   
Nina’s daughters do not fare much better. Lidiia, a twenty-something 
professional, becomes involved with her married boss, Andrei, who promises to whisk 
her away for a holiday abroad. However, Lidiia’s vision of romance abroad dissolve 
when she learns from Andrei’s wife that he has taken another lover on Lidiia’s promised 
jaunt. She also sees the result of her infidelity in the suffering of another woman, 
Andrei’s wife, who struggles to reign in her energetic children while begging Lidiia for 
information. The woman’s amplified loneliness shocks Lidiia, whose misguided hope for 
love rested on an unsound foundation of lust.  
Lidiia’s fifteen-year-old sister Nastia’s sexuality, however, ultimately ensures the 
family of women is fated to repeat its current dilemma. The young girl is impregnated by 
a naïve boyfriend, Misha. While certainly ill-equipped, Misha displays a genuine desire 
to be with Nastia and to help raise their child. He shows up on Nastia’s doorstep no less 
than three times, turned away without explanation repeatedly. The film ends with 
Nastia’s pregnancy announcement, followed by a seeming miracle as the bedridden 
grandmother joins the family and begins singing. While this finale is inconclusive, the 
men have fled and we are left to assume that it is women who are to bring about a new 
generation, although a stagnated one. It seems that for a third generation, the women have 
failed to close the circle of family with permanent fathers and husbands. Given this 
repeated pattern, we can safely assume Nastia’s child will be a girl, likely to perpetuate 
the shattered domestic edifice. 
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 When it comes to moral crisis about family, these films indicate that women are 
largely to blame. In Little Vera and Intergirl, a daughter’s misguided utilization of sex for 
adventure and material gain respectively bring about the downfall of the parents, who 
have failed to propagate a morally sound progeny. Assuage My Sorrow and Tragedy 
Rock-Style suggest that a mother’s inappropriate focus on sex impedes her ability to 
concentrate on domestic and familial duties. Moreover, the films imply that sex 
deteriorates a woman’s sense of maternal instinct, a more profound denunciation. Finally, 
these motifs are amalgamated within the image of a pregnant, fifteen-year-old Nastia in 
Adam’s Rib, whose female relatives provide a vivid reminder or women’s emotional and 
romantic destitution when sex is misused. The generational struggle in this film suggest 
that the crisis regarding mothers and daughters is ultimately one and the same.  
No Rest or Redemption for the Wicked 
Arguably the ultimate feature of glasnost-era filmmakers’ constructed 
misogynistic framework is a double standard in regards to redemption and second 
chances, afforded to women at a nominal rate in comparison to their male counterparts. 
Sexually liberated female characters are rarely endowed with the chance for resolution or 
reformation, and more often met with a death sentence. While this can be said to be a 
general trend in chernukha, women’s “death sentences” are typically punishment for 
sexual transgressions. Chernukha suggests that both men and women have been haplessly 
tormented and deformed by the system. Yet, the blame for moral degradation falls on 
women, who corrupt morality with sexuality. Similarly inspired as the aforementioned 
model, filmmakers of the glasnost period equate women with familial and moral 
responsibility, while freeing men of these same obligations. Drawing on a literary 
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tradition of the Silver Age, even the most contrite female characters must be neutralized 
if plagued with sexuality.89 As women are continuously denied a chance for redemption, 
this trend acts as the dominant misogynistic mode in glasnost-era film, ensuring 
punishment for female sexuality even after the film’s conclusion. 
A lack of redemption for sexually conscious women is most prevalent in Intergirl, 
a film which utilizes the “hooker with a heart of gold” archetype to full effect.90 
According to Goscilo, Tania’s seeming Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde duality syndrome is a 
symbol of Russia’s own troubled transitional process in the perestroika years: her 
penchant for high culture poetry and her affection for animals starkly contrasts to her 
economically motivated sexual services.91 The moral crisis in Intergirl stems from an 
uncertainty about importing capitalism during perestroika, and for Soviet filmmakers, 
prostitution optimizes the corrupting power of capitalism at every level. We witness 
Tania’s selfless actions on multiple occasions. She is silhouetted by the sun’s bright rays 
whenever she tenderly treats her patients, highlighting her altruistic nature and relating 
her to godliness itself. Even after she successfully emigrates from the Soviet Union, 
material plenty soon loses its luster and Tania becomes deeply concerned about the 
family and friends she left behind. Yet even as Tania throws away her luxurious western 
lifestyle to literally race back across the border, redemption is denied to her as she 
crashes in a foreign car at the literal and metaphorical border between Russia and the 
west.  
                                                                
89 Goscilo, Dehexing Sex, 69; Borenstein, Overkill, 30.  
90 Goscilo, Dehexing Sex, 74. 
91 Ibid, 79-80. 
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 At the same time, we witness numerous second chances afforded to men in 
Todorovsky’s film. In her quest to leave the country, Tania must procure the official 
consent of her estranged father. Surprised and concerned by the bureaucratic delay, Tania 
nevertheless seeks out her biological father, who she finds living with a new family on 
government assistance. Seemingly no less besmirched by capitalistic incentive than 
Tania, her father refuses to give consent unless Tania provides him a sizable ransom. Her 
father’s cupidity pushes Tania into one last act of prostitution, a profession she swears off 
after Edward’s proposal. Tania’s father is a repugnant image for Soviet viewers, as he 
willingly trades his daughter’s virtue for rubles. Likewise, his embodiment of the 
absconding father trope and his willingness to live on welfare in lieu of a profession 
epitomizes the perestroika period’s “crisis of masculinity.” Yet his second incarnation 
with a new family and the eventual pay off from his daughter constitutes a second chance 
not afforded to Tania herself. The dichotomy suggests that Tania’s sexual sins surpass 
even the most abhorrent male transgressions. 
 Tania’s death demonstrates arguably the most powerful example of women’s 
inability to find redemption in the chernukha film mode. Escaping from the capitalist 
“prison” that is Edward’s Swedish villa, Tania speeds back across the Swedish-Soviet 
border as she senses something gravely wrong. Simultaneously, Tania’s mother discovers 
her daughter’s past and commits suicide by inhaling fumes from her oven. Death by 
kitchen appliance holds a highly symbolic role for Tania’s mother, who has lived and 
died by the domestic standard, and whose only sin is rearing a morally corrupt offspring. 
In that moment, Tania spins out of control and dies in an automobile collision. Utilizing 
Goscilo’s analysis of “time forward” and “time back,” which collapses generations of 
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women into a paradoxically timeless stasis in the “present,” we can assess that Tania and 
her mother are inextricably linked as one.92 Inexplicably, Tania senses her mother’s 
impending death and dies herself. This conclusion also suggests that moral culpability for 
deviant sexuality rests not only in the female perpetrator, but with previous generations of 
women.  
 Other glasnost-era films with female protagonists offer similar circumstances 
where a likeable heroine is ultimately given the death sentence for her sexuality while her 
male co-star is awarded a second chance. Sergeev’s noir-inspired The Assassin provides 
one such example. Ol’ga’s love affair with Andrei seems like an infraction against 
literary dogma, unless we are to understand rape as a minor offense. According to 
Attwood, “Andrei’s part in the supposed sexual abuse is seen as nothing more than a 
male prank, a mere sexual misdemeanor.”93 Although both characters die, Andrei’s death 
is ultimately shouldered by Ol’ga, whose dissolute quest for vengeance has cost him his 
life at the hands of the very rogues she hires. Her own death, a suicide by shotgun, is only 
initiated by her lover’s demise. In the ultimate film noir conclusion, Ol’ga’s sexual 
autonomy is so profoundly neutralized that her death automatically follows Andrei’s. 
Andrei is exculpated by Ol’ga’s forgiveness, yet Ol’ga receives no such leniency for 
attempting to redeem her violated sexuality.  
 This trend is further observable in Abay Karpykov’s tawdry feature Blown Kiss 
(1990), a film about an 18-year-old nurse’s (Nastia) sexual awakening after her fiancé’s 
refusal to consummate the relationship before marriage. Nastia engages in a steamy 
sexual affair with a mysterious, bandaged race car driver under her care. She also learns 
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to utilize her sexuality to get what she wants from the males around her, including a 
childhood friend who works nearby as a gardener. When Nastia’s surgeon fiancé, Sergei, 
discovers the two locked in a kiss, he confronts Nastia. He admits his abstinence is 
motivated by a rape he committed in his past. Seemingly unfazed, Nastia proclaims it was 
Sergei’s lack of interest that drove her into the arms of other men. The film ends with the 
two reconciling and speeding off on Sergei’s motorcycle. However, they crash and Nastia 
dies due to Sergei’s recklessness. Because of Sergei’s past history of sexual violence, he 
chooses abstinence to prevent repeating the act on his fiancé. Nastia, on the other hand, is 
unable to control her sexual desire for even a moment. Unlike Nastia’s repeated instances 
of sexual immorality, Sergei’s sexual restraint is held up as morally exemplary. Only 
when Nastia finally persuades Sergei into sexual activity does he speed out of control on 
his motorcycle and crashes.94 Miraculously, it is Sergei who survives the high-speed 
impact, while the sexual seductress, Nastia, receives the death sentence.   
 Once the question of “who is to blame” is answered, the rules of literature would 
demand a fitting punishment. Sexually emancipated women in glasnost film are faulted 
for the weakening of the Soviet family, which ultimately leads to the vulnerability of 
future Soviet generations. In turn, women are deprived of redemption or second chances 
when they seek them in Little Vera, Intergirl, The Assassin, and Blown Kiss. These films 
suggest that the appropriate punishment for sex outside the marital-procreative context is 
death. However, this standard is applied primarily to women, whilst men are given either 
an exemption or a second chance in these films. This trend indicates that filmmakers held 
substantially more trepidation about women’s sexual liberation than men’s. 
                                                                
94 Lynne Attwood argues this scene is an evident metaphor for sexual violence, as Nastia implores 
Sergei to slow down while he ignores her pleas. Attwood, “Sex and the Cinema,” 75. 
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 “Becoming Men Again,” But at the Expense of Women? 
Examining women as incidental figures, women as architects of familial 
destruction, and women as irredeemable sinners showcases a pattern of misogyny in 
glasnost-era film. However, a more robust analysis of the late-Soviet “crisis of 
masculinity” provides a degree of affective motive for consistently grim portrayals of 
women in the chernukha aesthetic. As expressed by writer and literary critic Viktor 
Erofeev in his 1999 book, Muzhchiny (Men),  
“Late Soviet liberal discourse in both academia and society saw men as 
biologically, psychologically, and demographically weaker than women –
engaging in risky behaviors that indicated a ‘crisis of masculinity’ because 
of their inability to perform their traditional roles as family breadwinners. 
That was then, this is now. The Russian guy is getting up off all fours. It is 
time for him to become a man.”95 
 
Erofeev was neither the first nor the last to recognize a “crisis of masculinity” in the late 
Soviet period. Soviet demographer Boris Urlanis launched the ongoing discussion in an 
article published in a 1970 edition of Literaturnaia gazeta.96 The notion that it was 
indeed time for the Soviet muzhik (sneaky male) to “become a man” (stat’ chelovekom) 
was widespread in late-Soviet literature, and is recognizable in cinema as well. Thus, 
analyzing an expressed antipathy to women’s sexual emancipation in glasnost-era film 
illustrates a fuller picture of the degree and nature of misogyny in these films.  
 Whereas women felt the wrath of disgruntled men in chernukha, the power 
dynamics between men and women were ultimately defined and intertwined with the 
state, which figured prominently in gender relations. A rudimentary explanation of the 
power quotient between the Soviet state and the Soviet man equates the state to the 
                                                                
95 Zdravomyslova and Temkina, “Crisis of Masculinity,” 13 
96 Ibid, 16. 
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“Motherland,” and thus the state’s gender is unambiguously female.97 Consequently, the 
affective punishment exacted on women in chernukha cinema can be interpreted as 
symbolic denouncement of the Soviet state and system. However, an alternative 
explanation considers the social consequences of power balance between the Soviet state, 
men, and women, and suggests that the Soviet state’s measures to “embolden” women 
bred men’s sense of resentment towards women.98 According to cultural scholars Elena 
Zdravomyslova and Anna Temkina, there were several reasons why men could have 
reasonably fostered negative associations toward women. These reasons include the fact 
that men were the demographic minority and had a life span of ten years less on average 
than women.99 Additionally, men felt a mounting pressure to succeed professionally from 
both the state and their families even while the country’s economic predicament steadily 
worsened in the late 1980s. This occurred while women were given a supposed reprieve 
by Gorbachev to retreat to the home.100 Thus, anger towards women under the 
abovementioned conditions cannot be completely explained as an allegorical response to 
a system that fostered unachievable standards of masculinity. While the state may be 
blamed for perceivably disenfranchising men, the films’ depictions of sexism must be 
considered as addressing women themselves, separate from the state. Whether women 
actually benefitted from the state’s social engineering is less relevant here than how men 
                                                                
97 Goscilo, Dehexing Sex, 69. 
98 Cultural scholar Zhanna Chernova offers an alternative gender dynamic between state, men, and 
women, arguing that the state occupied a “third,” and hegemonic gender in the late-Soviet period. 
Chernova, “The Model of ‘Soviet’ Fatherhood,” 38. 
99 Zdravomyslova and Temkina, “Crisis of Masculinity,” 17-8. 
100 Helena Goscilo, “The Gendered Trinity of Russian Cultural Rhetoric Today – or the Glyph of 
the H[i]eroine,” in Soviet Hieroglyphics: Visual Culture in late Twentieth-Century Russia, ed. Nancy 
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may have perceived women’s privilege. Therefore, the misogynistic framework in these 
films extends beyond the state and indicts women.  
Much of the male ire around women’s sexualities in glasnost-era cinema is 
associated with the domestic sphere, and men’s own inability to actively control their 
collapsing private lives. The trend of disenfranchising fathers began almost immediately 
following the Revolution, and the Law Codes of 1926 essentially deprived fatherhood of 
its economic and legislative base.101 Examining men’s strained roles as fathers and 
husbands, specifically in cases where men endeavor to fulfill these roles in spite of 
stacked odds, demonstrates the level to which male immorality and dysfunction relies on 
women in glasnost-era cinema. Examples of this phenomenon are observable in Assuage 
My Sorrow and Tragedy Rock-Style, films in which fathers and husbands try and fail to 
realize these proscribed roles. Filmmakers may not have intentionally aimed to scapegoat 
women as the sole cause of men’s failed familial ventures, and indeed the films’ 
substance often indict the Soviet system for restricting men’s ability to reasonably 
function in a domestic capacity. However, women’s primary function as bearers of moral 
virtue exists disproportionately with their otherwise secondary roles in both films. In 
these depictions, the crisis of masculinity stems not only from the system’s dysfunctional 
and corrupt nature, but also from the shortcomings of women in a domestic sphere 
(usually because of sexual distractions). Thus, glasnost-era films that aim to put on 
display the system’s emasculation of men also charge women, to whom the system grants 
absolute authority in the domestic sphere.102 
                                                                
101 Kukhterin, “Fathers and Patriarchs,” 74. 
102 Until adulthood, the typical male upbringing was dominated by female nurture and pedagogy. 
This was a trend that continued in a more metaphorical sense in adulthood, as absolutely everything came 
under the control of the “powerful, maternal Communist Party.” Kon, Sexual Revolution, 151.  
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This is evident in Assuage My Sorrow, as the film’s bleak setting and Boris’s 
inability to physically vacate the apartment are mostly products of the Soviet system. The 
feature was delayed by the artistic council of the company which created it, Mosfil’m, 
which argued Prokhorov’s and Alexandrov’s film portrayed a Soviet reality that was “too 
gloomy” and would probably be blocked for its subversion of ideology by the Conflict 
Commission.103 Yet the Conflict Commission, in an unusual turn of events, rejected the 
ruling of its lesser organ and allowed the film to be screened unchanged. This may have 
been because the primary indictments for the “gloomy” setting are the mother and wife 
models, not of the Soviet system directly. Any doubts about whom Boris blames for his 
broken family are resolved in the aftermath of his failed reconciliation attempt with ex-
wife Liuba, when he takes out his frustrations on another young woman. The vagrant 
El’ia, who Boris houses for a night, stands in as the embodiment of failed Soviet 
motherhood in the absence of Boris’s ex-wife.104 She is literally without a meaningful 
anchor, as she wanders without a home. El’ia escapes the domestic sphere, seeking an 
abortion early in the film. Boris equates her with his failed marriage when she prances 
around naked, “trying to get comfortable.” Boris replies to El’ia’s nude liberties with, 
“Comfortable? All you dogs [emphasis added] have become far too comfortable.” The 
subsequent rape of the young woman, who has gotten far too “comfortable” outside a 
prescribed domestic standard, evidences who the filmmakers authentically find guilty.  
Boris’s lack of dignity and his subsequent loss of control are certainly not 
exclusively his ex-wife’s fault. Yet Boris’s chronic malaise at being forced to live with 
                                                                
103 Anna Lawton, Kinoglasnost: Soviet Cinema in Our Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), 58. 
104 There is an element of irony here, as this is the first time Boris is reasonably able to gain 
physical distance from Liuba. Instead of the relief he desires, we witness what appears to be a mental break. 
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his ex-wife, who persistently pursues other men in his presence, is deeply troubling. He 
struggles to keep hold of whatever “compensatory masculinity” he can by beating and 
raping women.105 Boris views women as imbued with the task of keeping domestic 
harmony and the resources to do so, and yet women ostensibly ignore their obligations by 
insisting on divorce or aborting their children. Unable to remedy the familial trouble 
himself, Boris abuses women. The state, the force which ultimately prevents Boris from 
moving away and starting anew, is never expressly charged in the film. While we can 
reasonably assume that Boris’s attack on his wife and El’ia are allegory for his disdain 
for the state, his pronouncement that “all you dogs have become far too comfortable” 
suggests his animosity is primarily aimed at the sexually emancipated women he 
encounters. 
Alternatively, Tragedy Rock-Style initially presents the uncommon scenario of a 
healthy, single-father home.106 However, the tranquility is decimated by an immoral and 
emasculating system, encapsulated within a corrupt legal system riddled with mafia 
connections. According to Horton and Brashinsky, the film “is the father-son narrative 
that embodies the contemporary [glasnost-era] Soviet crisis.”107 Vitia’s posthumously 
recorded reflection, that “children brought up on lies cannot be moral,” is unequivocally 
directed at the Soviet system. However, Kulish’s fumbles in his attempt to conclusively 
cast the system as nefarious and unjust, and the male mafiosi villains come across as 
clunky, generic, and two-dimensional figures. Instead, Vitia’s strained relationship with 
                                                                
105 Borenstein, Overkill, 45. 
106 In 1999 the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute for Socioeconomic Problems of the 
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his “telephone mother” appears definitively more formative for the teen. This also holds 
true when considering whom Vitia blames for his desperate situation, the mafia or his 
mother. Evidence that he casts his mother as guilty is present when Vitia enters his 
altered, psychedelic state and envisions idyllic beach-side walks with his mother during 
his childhood. Vitia’s mother proves to be the last image he sees even before he dies.  
Such flashbacks featuring Vitia’s father, the parent we are led to believe primarily 
raises the teen, are curiously missing. “Even when the father was physically present,” 
writes Kon about late-Soviet domestic spaces, “his influence and authority in the family 
and his role in bringing up the children were usually considerably less than that of the 
mother.”108 Even in Vitia’s rather extreme case, where his mother is completely absent 
and his father is an exemplary parent, the culpability for Vitia’s suffering rests with his 
mother, just by her physical absence, as much as with the Soviet state.109 She does not 
make an onscreen appearance until after Vitia’s death. It is not until after her arrival that 
she is informed of what transpired and collapses into tears. While the mafiosi go 
unpunished in this film, we are left with the brutal image of a mother grieving her child.  
Depictions of men failing to dominant in the domestic sphere, and indictments 
against women for moral deterioration, can be found in almost every era of Soviet film 
and literature. The trend of disenfranchising patriarchal institutions was rooted in 
Marxism from the beginning.110 Yet the crisis of masculinity in the perestroika era 
expanded beyond the familial realm and existed as a discrete sort of anxiety of the 
                                                                
108 Kon, Sexual Revolution, 151. 
109 According to Denis Ioffe and Frederick White, Gorbachev’s policies gave rise to a new class of 
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perestroika years. According to cultural scholar Brian Baer, the Soviet system 
deconstructed male-male homosocial bonds and systematically minimized a space for 
platonic male friendships, which could be viewed as a brotherhood separate from the 
Soviet collective.111 Additionally, the perestroika period witnessed the importation of a 
variety of western products and ideas for the first time, including the previously 
forbidden topic of homosexuality.112 Thus, men in the perestroika years had the 
additional challenge of reclaiming homosocial bonds with the taboo threat of 
homosexuality supposedly undermining the process. In some ways, homosexuality 
embodied an ostensible western ideological onslaught. Thus in glasnost-era film, and 
even more so in the post-Soviet 1990s, the dominant means by which men relate to one 
another becomes via “compensatory masculinity,” where hyper-macho linguistic and 
bodily expressions preclude the possibility of being labeled a homosexual or not 
sufficiently masculine.113 Yet this male homosocial crisis can be interpreted as 
characteristically misogynistic. As Baer notes, in these chauvinistic depictions of 
masculinity, “women almost always function as a means of exchange between two rival 
males.”114 
In this respect, Ivan in Taxi Blues is a deeply troubling glasnost-era figure. While 
certainly the embodiment of compensatory masculinity, in that he can regularly be found 
brawling or working out, his longing to establish a homosocial bond with musician 
Aleksi result in an unwinnable situation for the cab driver. While the Jewish, well-
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dressed, and often emotional Aleksi clearly lacks either hegemonic Soviet masculinity or 
perestroika-era compensatory masculinity, Ivan vows to help him “become a man.” There 
are several instances in the film that may suggest that Ivan implicitly desires Aleksi 
sexually, a sign that Ivan’s makeshift masculinity is poorly equipped to nurture a healthy 
homosocial bond with the troubled Aleksi. According to cultural scholars Denis Ioffe and 
Frederick White,  
“The homosocial relationship in Taxi Blues is framed within a structured 
institutional relationship that mandates certain roles for men and women, 
boundaries that Aleksi and Ivan cannot so easily transgress, thereby 
demanding that Kristina [the prostitute] become the agent for the two men 
to consummate their relationship.”115 
 
This can be observed in the scene where Aleksi plays the saxophone for Ivan and 
Kristina, and ultimately entices her attention. The bisecting of Kristina as a sexual object 
between Ivan and Aleksi sublimates a deeper, subconscious sexual attraction the two men 
have for each other, which has been bred through the suppression of Soviet platonic male 
friendship. Notably, this depiction of masculinity in crisis utilizes a woman as an 
essentially inanimate intermediary between two males, suggesting that even a “strictly 
male” crisis could still be utilized for misogynistic effect in glasnost-era film.  
 The notion that it was time for the Soviet man to retake the mantle of dominant 
masculinity was widespread in the perestroika and glasnost years. While economic and 
political deterioration had endangered the ideal of masculinity engineered by the state, 
men’s aggression toward women in films like Tragedy Rock-Style, Assuage My Sorrow, 
and Taxi Blues cannot be fully understood as allegorical indictments against the state. 
Instead, the sexual violence against women, or sexual dominance to be more precise, 
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should be interpreted as symptomatic of men’s inability to view women as equals and 
their sense of powerlessness in the domestic sphere. 
Conclusion 
During the Silver Age of Russian literature, women’s sexual consciousness was 
represented as a socially threatening phenomenon.116 A similar tradition was adopted in 
early Bolshevik literature. As Borenstein states, “In the years prior to and following the 
revolution of 1917, the image of Mother Russia as either the helpless victim of rape or 
the wanton whore selling herself to the highest bidder could be found across the 
spectrum.”117 Analyzing women’s sexualities within glasnost-era filmmakers’ broader 
misogynistic tropes suggests this trend is not limited to Imperial Russia or the 
Revolutionary period, and can indeed be applied to the glasnost era as well. 
 Filmmakers were permitted to repurpose the Silver Age double-edged sword of 
Russian womanhood in chernukha film thanks to the new freedoms of glasnost. While 
analyzing their portrayals of women’s sexualities does not provide conclusive evidence 
of filmmaker’s sexism, it can reveal common anxieties expressed by filmmakers with 
diverse cultural and social philosophies and agendas. The duality of Fin-de-Siècle 
Russian womanhood, mother and whore, mirrors filmmakers own glasnost-era concerns 
about women as both the most morally vital and morally susceptible in Soviet society.  
Thus, the sex in glasnost-era films cannot be seen as decidedly liberating for women. 
Instead, it represents a continuation of a fairly conservative social and moral Russian 
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cultural tradition: defending women’s sexual virtue from a predatory outside world which 
seeks to destroy it, and the family bedrock with it.  
This continuity is complicated, however, by unique circumstances of the 
perestroika period. Women’s sexualities come into crisis as they encounter circumstances 
that are uniquely “glasnost,” such as foreign-currency prostitution and youth culture. 
Thus, filmmakers utilize a misogynistic framework to express age-old concerns as well as 
anxieties about their contemporary dynamic and uncertain cultural, social, and political 
milieu. 
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CHAPTER 2 – THE WEAKEST LINK: POPULAR PRESS DISCOURSES ON SEX IN 
SOVIET SOCIETY 
Sex as a topic was opened to public scrutiny in Soviet newspapers and journals 
during glasnost. Like with film of the same period, the presence of sex in the popular 
press hardly indicates a fundamental shift in how sex was conceptualized in the Soviet 
Union. Journalistic discourses do not suggest that intellectuals’ attitudes about sex, nor 
sexuality, became markedly more permissive. In fact, the dominant trend in the glasnost 
print media was the continuation of previously restrictive principles regarding sexuality. 
Nonetheless, sex and sexuality did become new discursive proxies in this period, 
revealing social and moral anxieties about family and society.  
The news media’s apprehensions were grounded in fears about the supposedly 
dissolving state of morality and the family in the perestroika period. Perestroika brought 
with it economic, political, and social instability, and thus led to higher instances of 
crime, family breakups, and destitution in general. Journalists regularly suggested that 
sex was the root cause of these social ills, and their preparedness to make this connection 
reflected profound unease about reforms affecting perestroika-era Soviet society. 
Moreover, press discourses about sex’s potentially destructive force disproportionately 
singled out women as both the most vulnerable victims of a new sexual permissiveness, 
and those who could most profoundly damage society with their sexual transgressions. In 
essence, then, women are described as the weakest link, whose sexual compromise could 
be most disastrous to Soviet society. 
Journalists’ discourse about sex in the transitional years reflect the liberties and 
limitations of glasnost more generally. According to Dejevsky, Gorbachev’s primary 
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intent with the glasnost reforms was not endorsement of “freedom of speech” in the 
western sense.118 Instead he aimed to achieve a goal of more limited proportions. Before 
1985, the Soviet people widely looked to newspaper publications for the “official” party 
line, and with only minor discrepancies in the coverage and details of news events.119 
However, newspapers continued to serve as the single most effective method to distribute 
ideas to a mass segment of the public. According to Androunas, Gorbachev’s glasnost 
was primarily targeted at the print press, who envisioned limited critiques of policies in 
order to improve aspects of the socialist system that had been degraded by lack of 
review.120 “Glasnost was allowed as an instrument of Gorbachev’s policy of ‘improving 
socialism’,” writes Androunas, “and a weapon of his struggle against orthodox 
Communists and the party nomenklatura.”121 Thus, the scope of glasnost was meant to be 
fairly limited, intended to improve the system without advocating any fundamental 
challenges.  
Soviet journalists focused on social problems, such as alcoholism, orphans, and 
homelessness because there was considerably less “red tape,” or state-enforced 
restrictions, in pursuing these narratives than in reporting on political developments.122 
Reporting on the Afghan War, party corruption, or expressing “heretical ideas about 
market economics,” remained treacherous territory for journalists, who could still not hint 
at the system’s fundamental inadequacies.123 Thus, discourse on social issues, notably 
sex, became increasingly common in the glasnost years. 
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The nature of sex discourse in the popular press evolved within this distinctly 
glasnost context. Journalists’ reportage of sex relied on a circumscribed, morally-driven 
rulebook. Thereby, the new availability of sex as a discursive proxy did automatically 
connote more liberal attitudes about sex and sexuality. Instead, popular press discourses 
suggest that conservative perspectives about sex and sexuality prevailed in the last years 
of the Soviet Union.  
No (Wo)Man’s Land: Between Erotica to Pornography 
The difference between “erotica,” or artistic depictions of sex or sexuality meant 
to evoke an aesthetic or emotional response, and “pornography,” or visual imagery of sex 
that are primarily meant to satiate sexual desire, were contested in the media in the 
glasnost period. “There must be a way to get away from asexual cinema without falling 
into dirt and vulgarity,” writes Krokodil film correspondent Pytr Smirnov in 1989, 
“However, we have yet to discover that way, and films like Little Vera, which depict 
young girls involved in sexual affairs, pardon my language, are simply pure bestiality.”124 
Smirnov’s comment reflects the media’s disinclination to differentiate between “erotica” 
and “pornography,” and indicates a reluctance to establish, in the words of sexologist 
Igor Kon, a “sophisticated sexual-erotic culture.”125 Furthermore, such declarations 
demonstrate a continued loyalty to the idea of sex as a procreative necessity. The press 
displayed a widespread refusal to acknowledge a difference between sensuality and 
sexuality in the glasnost period. Their expressed hesitations rested upon the perceived 
negative effects sexual imagery could have on women and families. Thus, even within a 
time period where the state did not actively prevent the development of an erotic culture, 
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journalists argued against such a phenomenon because they ruled that the stability of the 
social and moral order outweighed the need for erotic culture. In essence, the established 
sexual conservatism triumphed over sexual liberalism in the print media.  
The primary means by which the popular press expressed unwillingness to 
acknowledge erotica lies in discussions of sex in glasnost-era popular cinema versus 
pornography. The difference between sex and nudity in cinema and the burgeoning 
pornography industry was largely lost on popular press correspondents. Explicit sex 
scenes in popular cinema are described as precursors to full-on pornography. Journalists 
and film critics exclaimed that sexually “perverted” filmmakers aimed to intentionally 
undermine Soviet morality by normalizing explicit depictions of sex in cinema. 
One could argue that a sociopolitical system that circumscribed sex to the role of 
procreative necessity, as the Soviet civilization largely had, would be hard-pressed to 
observe a difference between erotica and pornography once suddenly given the freedom 
to do so. However, chalking up the press’s resistance to erotic culture to growing pains 
does not adequately reflect the complexity of journalists’ social and moral concerns 
during this period. Most notably, the denunciation of erotic culture was expressed largely 
through journalists’ discourses on women’s loss of wholesomeness and virtue in both 
popular film and pornography. As Graham observes, “The polemics surrounding 
chernukha largely mirrored the major sociopolitical debates regarding perestroika itself: 
how much critical exposé is too much? What symbols and ideals, if any, should remain 
‘untouchable’?”126 One of these “untouchable” ideas proved to be the concept of 
women’s sexual purity. The popular press claimed to defend women from explicit 
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displays of sexuality in both popular cinema and pornography. A Pravda correspondent 
laments on this seemingly downhill battle, writing about how pornography sales had 
spiked over a two year period.127 The November 1990 article states,  
“I see these ‘dead eyed’ girls, pictured nude on these magazine covers sold 
at metro kiosks…Surely this is not the life they envisioned for themselves. 
Do they not long for the conventions of the old world – love, family, a 
home? They have convinced themselves that the highest privilege is to 
appear in Playboy or to become a Hollywood ‘star,’ when really these 
western conventions are toxic for society and family. These are the new 
lessons taught to us by the heroines of Little Vera and Intergirl, and 
further perpetuated by pornography. What we need now is not erotica or 
pornography, as Dr. Igor Kon would suggest, but support for our Soviet 
families.”128  
This blurb typifies the popular press’s categorical resistance to screened sex in any form. 
Their opposition was united by a moral crisis that was female-oriented, and focused 
principally on the threat posed to women in their prescribed roles as morality bearers and 
heads of family. 
Discourses about sex in glasnost film and pornography were united by a 
discussion of potential repercussions that applied solely to girls and women.  Journalists 
argued that sex in cinema and pornography place girls and women into real danger. This 
disproportionate anxiety about women’s safety and moral virtue indicate journalist and 
film critics were concerned about how sexual imagery adversely impacted women’s 
ability to focus on family and the domestic space. 
Journalists’ apprehension applied primarily to young women, characterizing them 
as the most vulnerable targets of “erotic propaganda.”129 A letter featured in a March 
1989 issue of Sovetskaia kul’tura, signed by nine teachers and doctors of the “older 
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generation,” expresses concern for the state of teenagers’ morality and concludes that, 
“The screen is mostly to blame.”130 However, references to “teenagers” more often refer 
to teenage girls than to boys. The jointly-written letter laments, “At the age of 11, young 
girls and boys are already engaging in sexualized games, and by age 14, girls are lining 
up for their first abortions.”131  Even though both teen boys and girls are reportedly 
affected by screened sex, the mention of repercussions exclusively references young 
girls, who are impregnated and seek abortions.   
Moreover, journalists’ sense of anxiety about derailing girls’ and young women’s 
path to domesticity is expressed similarly in discourse about both film and explicit 
pornography. Two quotes, about popular cinema and about pornography respectively, 
exemplify this trend. “Films like Little Vera and An Extraordinary Incident aim to 
dissuade young people from the natural life path, which is love, marriage, and family, and 
wish to convince them that their selfish goals are more important,” writes a Pravda 
correspondent in November 1989.132 A Sovetskaia kul’tura article from the same year 
suggests that, “Pornography has the greatest effect on adolescents ages 13-14, whose 
perception of what is valuable in life – love, marriage, and family – becomes 
fundamentally warped by sexual imagery.”133 The fact that these two statements are 
nearly interchangeable highlights journalists’ lack of differentiation between erotica and 
pornography. The primary force that prevented this distinction is an overarching concern 
for women as domestic bastions, defending mainstays such as “love, marriage, and 
family.”  
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The print media’s consolidation of erotica and pornography under the umbrella of 
one destructive, anti-social phenomenon was not implicit. Instead, journalists, film 
critics, and other cultural commentators acknowledged the possibility of erotic culture in 
the glasnost era, and then actively vetoed it. Their explicit denouncement suggests a more 
active standard of conservatism than the comparatively passive model associated with the 
inability to decipher art from obscenity. Their arguments centered on the idea that the 
Soviet public was not prepared for, or “could not handle erotic culture.”134 Such 
expressions reflected journalists’ hesitations about a lack of censorship or regulation in 
portrayals of nudity and sex. However, they ultimately argued that the need for morally-
upright Soviet families overshadowed whatever cultural openness or educational 
opportunity erotica could offer. Their public debates about the pros and cons of erotic 
culture indicate that journalists actively deciphered the nuanced difference between 
artistic sensuality and carnal desire. And yet, their acknowledgement did not translate 
into approval. 
According to cultural commentators, erotica had a similar effect on the Soviet 
population as pornography and incited violence against women. Analyses that suggest 
that erotica was just as harmful as pornography hint at journalists’ profound sense of 
anxiety about women and the Soviet family, who are deemed extraordinarily fragile in 
this period. An article published in Sovetskaia kul’tura in April 1991 discusses the 
USSR’s December 1990 commission on regulating obscenities. 
“We must recognize the dangers these obscene images pose to our 
population, and take all measures to block them…As for erotica: 
unfortunately, this is not the time for erotica to flourish. We must first 
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focus on stabilizing our society and only then can we think about the 
possibility of erotic culture.”135  
The correspondent’s focus on timing suggests anxieties about erotica were not wholly 
interchangeable with those of pornography. Instead, journalists expressed concerns that 
were specific to the unstable conditions of the perestroika years. They concluded that the 
public was experiencing a particularly vulnerable moment, and that protecting moral 
virtue was of principal importance. The commentator disclaims that, “These sort of 
regulations can border on absurdity, as they did in the old days,” suggesting that the 
commission’s proposed solution was recognized as an extreme measure, and yet a 
necessary one in a period of particular fragility.136  
According to historian Paul Goldschmidt, the division between “high” and “low” 
culture in Russia was always more extreme than in the west in any given period.137 Yet, 
resistance to establishing an erotic culture in the glasnost era reflects unique anxieties in 
the glasnost era. According to Kon, an erotic culture did begin to take shape during 
perestroika.138 Novels that contained eroticism, such as Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita and 
James Joyce’s Ulysses, were published in their unabridged forms from 1985 onward. 
Artists held exhibitions of erotic paintings, books, and photography for the first time 
since the 1920s. At the same time, however, pornography which depicted all manner of 
sadistic sexual activity was recorded and distributed around the country. Occurring 
simultaneously was a nearly twenty-five percent increase in rape and sexual assault 
between 1988 and 1989, as well as increased instances of familial abandonment, teen 
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pregnancy, abortion, and prostitution.139 The print media suggested a direct link between 
pornography and the abovementioned social statistics. Given these circumstances, they 
were largely unwilling to consider erotica separate from pornography. It would be better, 
they argued, “to snuff out the cult of 
violence and sex at its root.”140 Figure 
2, a comic from a 1990 issue of 
Krokodil, encapsulates journalistic 
fears about exposing the public to 
erotica.141 It emphasizes the Soviet 
public’s inability to appreciate erotic 
art during the perestroika years and 
underscores the undesirable traits 
sensuality may inspire. In declining to 
differentiate between erotic art and 
pornography, the popular press 
exhibited an steadfast loyalty to sexually 
conservative principles. They also 
implicitly revealed startlingly low faith in the common Soviet citizen. 
A Legacy of Misogyny: Reporting on Prostitution 
Discourse about prostitution in the USSR proved to be misogynistic, as it almost 
always cast female prostitutes as the source of the growing epidemic. Additionally, the 
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popular press suggested that the solution to combatting prostitution began and ended with 
reforming prostitutes, and did not consider the “johns.” Thus, the media’s call to battle 
prostitution on “economic, moral, legal, and ideological fronts,” can be interpreted as 
exclusively targeting women.142 Ultimately, the focus on women aligns with the popular 
press’s conservatively-based moral crisis about women as the foundation of Soviet 
family, and the need to protect their sexual virtue. 
Discourses on prostitution during glasnost were just as novel as discourses on sex 
itself. Often viewed as an infiltrating mechanism of the west, sex was frequently 
dissected in a critical manner. The added burden of sex-for-pay solidified skeptics’ 
denouncements of the taboo topic. The early Bolsheviks declared victory over 
prostitution in the 1920s. For them, it symbolized the most malignant form of capitalism: 
selling the female body to the highest bidder. Furthermore, Bolsheviks quickly did away 
with the notion of “free love,” assigning non-marital sex the status of idle distraction at 
best and anti-revolutionary menace at worst. Prostitution was anathema to multiple facets 
of Bolshevik ideology. Thus, the print media’s discussion of prostitution was not limited 
to the context of sex, but extended to encompass poverty, crime, social justice, and 
womanhood. By the 1980s, many journalists acknowledged that the “war against 
prostitution,” was in fact, far from won. Although most did not seek to prove that 
prostitution had existed all along (thus undermining the regime), they provided 
conclusive evidence that at the very least, there had been a “resurgence” of the 
“vanquished” social ill. 
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This burgeoning reportage, however, was almost exclusively one-sided, focusing 
on the female prostitutes and ignoring the pimps and “johns” altogether. Glasnost-era 
journalists’ tendency to emphasize female prostitutes and overlook male patrons does not 
conclusively evidence sexism. However, the tone and nature of the media’s fascination 
with the seamy world of sex-for-pay was paradoxical, highlighting the need for social 
reform at the beginning of an article and castigating prostitutes as nefarious and 
materialistically motivated by the end. “Society must fight the factors that cause 
prostitution,” wrote a Pravda correspondent in 1989, “but not prostitutes themselves.”143 
This statement, made in the conclusion of the report, conflicts with the correspondent’s 
evaluation that, “Prostitution is melting away the virtue of young girls…It is young girls 
tempted by wealth who are at the greatest risk of becoming entrenched in this deviant 
subculture.”144 The correspondent’s relatively mild contradiction is augmented by other, 
more severe assessments. As the topic gained media attention, Chief Director for 
Combating Organized Crime and Corruption Ministry of Internal Affairs Aleksandr 
Gurov embarked on a media tour to quell concerns. His interviews in Sovetskaia kul’tura 
and Argumenty i fakty both began by identifying prostitution as a “disgraceful 
phenomenon of capitalist society, one which aims to sell the bodies of women.”145 Yet 
Gurov further assessed prostitution to be a fundamentally selfish endeavor on the side of 
women, who he identified as turning to the practice not out of economic need, but 
because of an “unwillingness to work.”146 Additionally, Deputy Gurov dismissed 
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accusations of a “moral dilemma” surrounding the practice of prostitution, and inferred 
that the issue was strictly economic. “Right now we have a mass problem, as in western 
countries,” concluded Gurov, “But is this a question about the exploitation of women? 
Nothing of the sort!”147 Notably, statements about the male patrons that kept this 
underground industry lucrative were omitted from Gurov’s assessment.  
Media ambivalence on the issue is most strongly evident in journalists’ interviews 
with, or exclusive profiles of, sex workers. These reports channel a fascination with the 
practice and lives of prostitutes. Naturally, these pieces disproportionately hinged on the 
phenomenon of foreign-currency prostitution, brought to the limelight by the film 
Intergirl (1989). Journalists simultaneously ignored the vast majority of the underground 
industry, where destitute women exchanged sex in dingy pay-by-the-hour hotels or 
railway stations for a few rubles.148 A Krokodil correspondent’s 1987 profile of a high-
end prostitute who tricked on the streets of Sochi under the alias Laura provides an 
example of how the media’s fixation on prostitution predated Intergirl. The article is one 
of the few to acknowledge johns in the world of prostitution, but within a context that 
places the blame exclusively on the female practitioners. “I felt dirty the whole time I was 
covering the story, and then I began to have negative [sexual] thoughts about every 
young woman I saw on the street.”149 This correspondent’s conclusion, then, suggests 
that women were wholly responsible for prostitution rather than responding to the 
demands of a male-driven market. Thus, the media’s call to battle prostitution can be 
interpreted as a call exclusively made against immoral women. 
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News media fascination with prostitution in the glasnost years was a phenomenon 
unique to the milieu of the perestroika period and represented a profound duality in 
regards to sex and women. It was purportedly the embodiment of capitalistic excess, and 
yet, multiple surveys suggest that one-third of high school girls freely admitted that they 
would exchange sex for currency in a sample size of one thousand.150  Another survey 
revealed that over half of Soviet women viewed sex work as a “feasible” career option in 
a sample size of over two thousand.151 Prostitution was also not so far removed from the 
misogyny of the film industry, and to a much greater extent, pornography. According to 
Goscilo, the film and popular press industries had normalized “the exploitation of 
women’s bodies as marketable commodities and objects of displaced male violence.” 
Prostitution proved to be on the extreme end of the spectrum, and yet a natural extension 
of the sort of sexual exploitation seen in glasnost-era cultural media. Ultimately, 
prostitution represented the culmination of Soviet paradoxes about women and sexuality. 
On the one hand, prostitution was entertained as a legitimate career option for women 
because it empowered them to gain a degree of economic autonomy. On the other hand, 
prostitutions’ normalization in everyday thought and in popular cinema elicited the print 
media’s expressed concern about moral wholesomeness in the perestroika years.  
Another theme that arises within prostitution reportage that is distinctly 
“perestroika” is the “capitalist nature” of this social ill, along with a sense of crisis about 
western ideology’s infiltration during an uncertain perestroika and demokratizatsiia 
(democratization) endeavor. Since the media’s attention was disproportionately focused 
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on high-end prostitutes who catered to foreign, western clients, prostitution and 
prostitutes became symbolic of capitalism and material excess within the print media. 
Historian Elizabeth Waters concludes that, “The prostitute became established as a 
symbol of the ‘golden world’ of dubious pleasures and unearned income, with a 
permanent place in the rogues’ gallery of ‘unlaboring’ types whose economic and 
ideological sins were, allegedly, responsible for the country’s present plight.”152 Thus 
there was a sense of panic in these pieces that western men were infiltrating the USSR 
and stealing the virtue of its women, or more precisely, those who were charged with 
leading the Soviet Union into a bright, morally wholesome future. In his interview with 
the high-end prostitute “Laura,” correspondent V. Vitalev from Krokodil asked, “Would 
you marry one of your western clients and emigrate?”153 Laura’s answer that she would 
not hesitate, echoed a profound trepidation about the future of the Soviet Union and 
western elements infiltrating the country, and worst of all, absconding with its women, 
and thus, Soviet virtue. This anxiety would draw over 40 million Soviet viewers to 
theaters two years later to see Todorovsky’s Intergirl, a film that gave artistic form to this 
palpable moral panic. Reflecting the double-sided coin of Russian national identity, one 
part maternal nurturer, one part whore, journalists’ sense of metaphorical panic was 
amplified when western clients were thrown into the mix of prostitution.154 
The reportage on prostitution amplified the character of the glasnost era. 
Journalists’ implications that prostitution had been eliminated up to perestroika and their 
disproportionate coverage of foreign currency prostitution reveals their anxieties about 
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west-inspired reforms. Additionally, the press’s undivided attention on women within 
prostitution, both as criminals and as victims, reflects a world in which women’s sexual 
transgressions were judged on a far harsher scale than their male counterparts.  Their 
suggestions that prostitutes choose their profession primarily to escape familial obligation 
and to pursue material comfort exposes a profound concern about the social and moral 
state of the Soviet people.  
The Threatening Force of Youth Culture 
Popular press discourse positioned itself against sex in burgeoning youth cultural 
movements. According to cultural scholar Hilary Pilkington, perestroika and glasnost 
helped to reorient the public’s attention away from the private sphere and onto a novel 
and fascinating public sphere, because reform policies focused on “bringing operations 
out into the open.”155 Paradoxically, it would seem, this reconfiguration increased 
expressed anxieties about the private sphere in the print media. A new focus on the public 
over the private brought about a blossoming of “youth culture,” where teens built peer 
networks around rock-n-roll, biker, and hippy subcultures, networks that existed separate 
from state-sanctioned youth communities such as the Komsomol. Thus, rock-n-roll, punk, 
biker, street, and hippy subcultures were widely considered deviant youth activity by 
journalists in the glasnost press. Moreover, girls and women were publically viewed as 
the objects of young men’s sexual desire within these youth movements. Journalists 
observed that girls within youth cultural activity were vulnerable, misguided, and 
attention-starved. As with the aforementioned phenomena, journalists referred to young 
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women as both the most at-risk within youth culture, and themselves potentially the most 
sexually deviant perpetrators. 
The film Tragedy Rock-Style captured the public’s fear about “the cult of sex” 
surrounding rock music by literally combining the reportedly destructive forces of youth 
culture with cultism, painting a distinctly negative picture of punk music and youth 
“escapism.”156 The popular press etched a similarly dark depiction of youth culture, one 
that viewed girls as those most vulnerable to the ill effects of youth culture and also those 
most susceptible to falling into hedonistic behaviors. A December 1990 profile of punk 
culture in Sovetskaia kul’tura denounced the entire scene, highlighting young women. 
“The girls that go to the punk concerts, they show up with their pimpled faces and their 
sagging breasts (wearing no bras), and they will do anything to gain the attention of the 
band or any other male who will take notice. They stand around, with their short skirts 
and their ridiculous black eye makeup, just begging for it.”157 The correspondent 
concluded by stating, “We must save our kids from rock-n-roll and the sex industry.”158 
Yet signals within the article suggested that the focus is preserving young girls’ virtue. 
Additionally, teens’ hedonistic behaviors proved to be a widespread concern, as questions 
about rock-n-roll “deviance” arose in casual interviews. An interview with the USSR’s 
popular thrash metal band Corrosion of Metal in December 1990 brough up such 
questions, and the correspondent asked group leader Sergei Troitsky about Satanism, 
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drugs, and sexual excess in “rock-n-roll.”159  Troitsky’s flippantly acknowledgment of 
these phenomena further presents readers with a sense of youths’ reckless hedonism. 
Furthermore, the activities of young people were said by many journalists to 
reflect the problems of the wider Soviet public, as one correspondent argued in an article 
titled “The Youth is a Mirror of Society.”160 Another correspondent noted that although 
people ages 13-24 comprise the largest segment of Soviet society, the membership of the 
Komsomol had shrank considerably while crime statistics continued to skyrocket.161 The 
popular press expressed anxieties about a large youth population that was steadily losing 
its interest in socialist values. 
In covering young people’s movement away from the status quo, newspapers 
focused primarily on sexually active teenage girls. Newspapers provided alarming 
statistics about teen pregnancy and abortion. Focusing on pregnancy and abortion in 
regards to teen sex assured that the discourse would be centered on young women. In 
November 1989, Argumenty i fakty presented a study of worldwide abortion rates which 
ran in TIME magazine and suggested that the USSR had the highest level of abortion by 
more than two times, with 181 per 1000 women between the ages of 15 and 44 receiving 
an abortion each year.162 Moreover, the correspondent does not dispute the figures, which 
came from the west and ordinarily would be questioned.  
Journalists further condemned what they viewed as the ultimate consequence of 
deviant youth sexual activity, teen motherhood. Motherhood was viewed as the 
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culmination to Soviet love and marriage, the means by which the Soviet future was 
ensured, and so its compromise appeared especially urgent. The press pointed to the 
widespread orphan problem as the ultimate consequence to youth sexual activity. A 
November 1987 report stated that 300 thousand children live in orphanages and 700 
thousand orphans were in guardianships.163 The correspondent noted that the delegate 
from the Soviet Children’s Fund stressed educating young [my emphasis] women about 
family and motherhood.164 Another, more pointed article stated,  
“According to the Ministry of Health, 95 percent of these orphans’ parents 
are alive [my emphasis]. 71 percent of orphans are born to young, single 
women...Apart from the strictly moral argument, we must recognize that 
girls ages 15 to 19 cannot afford to have children. Let us encourage our 
young girls to avoid sexual temptations and wait until they are married and 
stable, so that their children may avoid falling into a vicious cycle.”165  
The correspondent’s concern about repeating a “vicious cycle” reveals the extent to 
which teen pregnancy came to be seen as a detrimental phenomenon. Ultimately, the 
threat of teen pregnancy transformed what may otherwise be explained as a harmless 
teenage phase in a harmful phenomenon for future Soviet generations. Children raised 
without a mother were seen as far less likely to fit the Soviet ideal of patriotic, productive 
citizens. Journalists, then, expressed anxieties about young women’s abilities to 
compromise an entire Soviet generation with early pregnancies.  
Journalists argued there was an inextricable link between youth culture and sex, 
and films like Tragedy Rock-Style and Little Vera bolstered their statements. Thus, the 
print media also reported on the possibility for enhanced “sex education,” which provided 
for arguably the most liberal sex discourse of the glasnost-era. Yet even as 
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correspondents entertained the notion of expanding sex education to encompass the 
realities of teens’ sexual behaviors, their discourses remained fundamentally conservative 
as they focused once more on the ultimate goal, marriage and family. An article 
published in Argumenty i fakty in February 1987 espoused the need to educate the youth 
on sex. “Every young person should have knowledge of hygiene and a healthy lifestyle. 
There is plenty of sex in the west, and yet the west does not educate people about it. Their 
ruling class utilizes sex as a tool to isolate and distract the public from the problems at 
hand...A socialist society does not have such individualist moral permissiveness.”166 
While the correspondent advocated for a limited expansion of “sexual hygiene,” he did so 
within a moralist context. Rather than taking the restrictive approach, some journalists 
leaned toward expanding young people’s informational standard. Ultimately, however, 
the goal was not the sexual emancipation of the public. Rather, journalists argued that 
curing sexual ignorance would embolden young people against the lure of hedonism, and 
would lead them toward a path free of “individualist moral permissiveness.” 
Another article, published in 1991, echoed this sentiment in response to a 15-year-
old’s question about masturbation. “It’s about time we cleared up these myths about the 
harmful nature of masturbation. Science long ago proved that there are no harmful effects 
to this natural practice. If we are to nurture a generation with strong marriage and family 
values, we must accept the reality of people’s sexual natures.”167 Such calls to expunge 
myths about sex also favored expanding young people’s base of knowledge, rather than 
promoting wholesome restriction of any nonprocreative sexual activity. However, they 
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did so with a sense of resignation, or an attitude of, “If you can’t beat them, join them.” 
In “joining them,” the ultimate goal was to retake control of young people’s sexual 
behaviors, and in a roundabout way, lead them back to love, marriage, and family.  
Thus, seemingly opposing discourses from those against and those for expanding 
sex education proved to be more united than they at first appear. These new discussions 
of sex education elicited strong restrictive responses. Historian James Riordan quotes a 
reader’s response to a “mildly” educational column about sex in the youth paper 
Moskovskii komsomolets, “People old enough already know or can find out for 
themselves...We knew nothing about ‘sex’ or ‘erotica’ before, but we still produced 
healthy children...We had real love, a sense of duty, love for our mothers, our country, 
patriotism, and so on.”168 This statement condemns sex education taught to teenagers, and 
yet, such denouncements were not so different from calls for sex education. They were 
both impassioned responses to a crisis of youth sexuality, which called for drastic and 
unorthodox actions, such as the expansion of sex education. The letter-writer’s statement 
about “real love,” and a “sense of duty,” reflected the stated goals of sex education 
proponents. These goals were fairly conservative in nature, and did not call for the 
disposal or even the relaxation of the old model of duty-bound, morally wholesome sex.  
The moral crisis surrounding youth culture, moreover, was overwhelmingly 
targeted at young women. According to Attwood, there was considerable media attention 
focused on teenage girls during the perestroika period as they headed into their child-
bearing years.169 There were also clinical studies conducted that suggested that girls and 
women were less capable of making morally sound choices under stress. One such study 
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conducted in the 1980s by sociologists L.S. Sapozhnikova found that teen girls had a 
greater tendency to defer to males in morally challenging situations, and were generally 
less likely to be “guided by moral principles.”170 Such studies reinforce the conclusion 
that the popular press generally treated girls as the weakest link in Soviet society, and 
explains why girls in youth subcultures received disproportionate attention in the print 
media.  
Men as Hostages of Female Sexuality? 
Although the vast majority of popular press sex discourses in the transitional 
period focused on women, there are traces within the texts that reflect the period’s “crisis 
of masculinity.” Recognizing and examining the crisis of masculinity in the popular press 
uncovers a more complete picture of the degree and nature of journalists’ social and 
moral anxieties. A December 1990 issue of Krokodil features a full spread of cartoons, 
depicting the pervasive role of sex in everyday life.171 A ubiquitous theme in such comics 
is men’s distraction from everyday professional and martial duties. Two cartoons 
included a wife coming home to find her husband with a nude woman (or women), while 
another featured a wife and husband arguing about nudity on television while their son 
sits by and watches. A third portrayed a man daydreaming about pornographic magazines 
instead of focusing on a Party meeting. Cartoons of this nature suggested that men were 
ultimately powerless to control their sexual urges. More fundamentally, however, they 
hinted at men’s vulnerability in the face of women’s transparent sexuality. They 
bemoaned women’s explicit sexuality as a harmful phenomenon not only for stability in 
the domestic sphere, but also for men in their personal and professional lives. Women 
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were ultimately imbued with the power to derail men in their most fundamentally 
masculine endeavors: Party and professional life. Additionally, men’s moral integrity was 
placed into crisis, as men found themselves unable to resist sexual enticement. Popular 
press discourses, then, exposed journalistic fears about the feeble-minded Soviet male, 
unable to resist sexual lures. Furthermore, they suggested that women’s sexuality had the 
power to jeopardize economic and political stability in society. 
The primary anxiety about male sexuality in the glasnost popular press related to 
the integrity of an already endangered masculine identity, then further subjected to 
degradation thanks to explicit depictions of female sexuality both in erotica and in 
pornography. As in film, the popular press implicitly entertained the debate about how to 
once again restore masculine identity to its revolutionary potential. According to 
Goldschmidt, the primary cultural concern revolved around the muzhik, the archetype of 
an artful and immoral male who fails to live up to masculine standards, and who “finds a 
way to entertain himself with smut and scandal.”172  To a certain extent, men found 
themselves in a public double bind in regards to reacting to an onslaught of sexually 
explicit material. Unable to attain the ideal of Soviet masculinity through fulfillment of 
professional goals thanks to the abysmal economic climate of the perestroika years, men 
sought to ameliorate the crisis of masculinity by exercising “compensatory 
masculinity.”173 This macho image required men to ostensibly display abundant virility. 
Thus, men could not completely denounce pornographic images without forfeiting this 
last expression of masculinity.  
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Journalists who passionately vilified pornography and prostitution also subtly 
acknowledged its irrefutable draw for men. “I felt dirty the whole time I was covering 
this story,” reported a correspondent who profiled urban prostitutes for a 1987 issue of 
Krokodil, “I showered three times a day...I began to notice that I was having negative 
[sexual] thoughts about every young woman I saw on the streets.”174 A 1989 article in 
Sovetskaia kul'tura about explicit sex in cinema fretted, “Our correspondent in 
Ordzhonikidze was afraid [my emphasis] to finish watching the films for this report 
because he feared seeing blatant sex acts.”175 Articles like these openly expressed angst 
about the power of sexual imagery on men, whose compensatory masculinity required a 
carnal response to the naked female form. Moreover, these implicit statements imbued 
sexually “emancipated” women with a degree of power over men, elevating female 
prostitutes and porn stars to the dreaded status of succubi.                                      
 Journalists’ conclusions that women’s preoccupation with sex degraded the 
domestic sphere appear to be a logical deduction, since women were traditionally tasked 
with both the physical and the moral upkeep of the home and family. Yet journalistic 
anxieties about women’s sexuality came full circle in discourses about how pornography 
and prostitution distracted men from professional and political obligations. In essence, 
journalists regurgitated the concerns Lenin expressed about “free love” in the 1920s, that 
preoccupation with sex diverted men from their revolutionary pursuits. However, a more 
complex, and uniquely glasnost-era fear also emanated from the discourse of this period: 
that men’s newfound obsession with pornography and prostitutes was drawing them 
further into compensatory masculinity and farther from the traditional, hegemonic 
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paradigm. A correspondent for Izvestiia reported in May 1990 on his experiences 
interviewing men who were waiting in line to buy pornography in metro kiosks. “They 
were like zombies…They thought nothing of wasting an hour in line, losing their sense of 
purpose and themselves.”176 The anxieties about women’s sexuality, then, transcended 
the domestic and familial arena and permeated economic and political contexts, by 
threatening men’s sociopolitical priorities. 
Conclusion 
 Journalistic discourse on sex in the glasnost era can be more fully contextualized 
as part of a conservative, “profamily” trend among intellectuals. Reactionary discourse 
about women was one of the products of social, political, and economic instability during 
the perestroika era. Journalists considered the state of the Soviet gender hierarchy from 
many angles during the glasnost period, hoping that within gender would lie a remedy for 
their anxieties. One of the most frequent questions was about women in their capacities 
as mothers. After an ostensible spike in youth violence and crime, journalists questioned 
women’s abilities to bear the double burden of professional and familial responsibility. 
An Argumenty i fakty correspondent questioned Secretary Galina Suhorochenkova of the 
Trade Unions of the Soviet Union about the needs of working mothers. Ultimately, both 
the correspondent and Secretary Suhorochenkova tended to agree that, to some extent, 
professional obligation interfered with women’s domestic duties and with the moral 
upbringing of the next Soviet generation. 
Correspondent N. Akritova: “Gorbachev has claimed that women’s 
rightful place is in the home, raising our future generations. People seem 
to agree with this statement. How then can we help working women?” 
Secretary Suhorocehnkova: “We need to expand women’s access to part-
time hours, and get them away from the strenuous, long work conditions 
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which might ultimately damage their health, and which definitely impede 
their ability to have children and to raise them morally.”177   
Secretary Suhorocehnkova’s statement represents a reactionary step because it suggested 
that women’s reproductive sexuality was more important than women’s labor in the 
perestroika period.  
In addition to the more obviously “profamily” discourse, such as the erstwhile 
article, journalists expressed their conservatism by highlighting nonreproductive sex and 
its potentially negative implications. The use of sex as a discursive proxy was a novel 
technique, made possible by glasnost. Examining journalistic discourse on sex suggests 
that the dominant trend in the glasnost print media was the continuation of previously 
restrictive principles. Public debate over sex, especially in regards to women, did not 
signify that the intelligentsia’s attitude about sexuality in social and moral contexts had 
become notably more permissive. Moreover, the nature of sex discourse suggests that 
journalists retained a significant degree of conservatism during glasnost in the absence 
(or reduction) of top-down coercion.  
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EPILOGUE –  A POST-SOVIET PARADOX 
 The idiom “parade of horribles” originates from parades of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries in the United States and Europe, which featured participants 
wearing comic and grotesque costumes and scaring parade goers. However, as a 
rhetorical device it refers to showcasing a list of extremely undesirable events that will 
supposedly result from a preliminary action or phenomenon. The idiom is classified 
under “appeal to emotion” in any logician’s handbook. In the case of glasnost-era 
discourses on sex and sexuality, filmmakers and journalists employed this hyperbolic 
method to full effect. Glasnost provided intellectuals a new discursive proxy, which they 
utilized in order to express both anxieties about the state of social and moral affairs in the 
perestroika period, and to offer prophetic visions of a world consumed by sex.  
 It is ironic, then, that in the two and a half decades following the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, sex has become a mainstay in all things cultural and journalistic in Russia. 
In 1989, a periodical titled SPID-info (AIDS Info) came into print, aimed originally at 
combatting Soviet ignorance regarding sexually transmitted diseases.178 However, these 
prophylactic goals were steadily replaced with nude images of women, lifestyle and sex 
advice, as well as tabloid coverage of Russian and international celebrities. By 1994, 
SPID-info had the highest subscription rate of any periodical in Russia.179 In that same 
year, the editorial board voted to add a masthead to the cover page of Spid-info, reading 
“SPEED” in Latin letters. The transformation of Spid-info, from defender of Soviets’ 
health and wellbeing to soft pornography with no social mission, widely reflects the 
arguments of many glasnost-era intellectuals who used sex as a discursive proxy, that the 
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Soviet public “could not handle erotic culture.”180 The periodical’s metamorphosis 
further illustrates intellectuals’ anxieties about the abundance of newly transparent 
sexuality, which began in the glasnost years; Spid-info’s focus has shifted from collective 
good to individual hedonism, with no obvious moral qualms from the editors. The name 
change, too, is a meaningful expression: “SPEED” represents a desire for instant 
gratification, a veritable denouncement of Soviet ideology. Likewise, the use of bold, 
capitalized Latin letters signifies the adoption of a sexually permissiveness that 
intellectuals would characterize as unequivocally western.  
Figure 3. The March 2011 issue of Spid-info. The article on the right is titled, “Husband sends me 
off to stripper courses.”  
 But, sex as a theme has not been confined to intentionally seamy publications like 
Spid-info, and has extended into every conceivable aspect of Soviet life. Women made 
light of being “gold diggers,” a newly acceptable term in post-Soviet Russia, referring to 
women who sought men primarily for their wealth. Beauty contests, which featured a 
particularly risqué bikini portion, became prominent. The winners frequently, and 
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unabashedly, made it known that they were looking for an eligible, and very wealthy 
suitor. Women also competed to procure a rich husband from the “New Russian” stock, 
men who had made their fortune during the Soviet collapse.181 For those who lacked the 
luck or physical assets to draw one of these rare entrepreneurs, there was another 
opportunity: the infamous world of “mail-order brides,” which became an ever more 
popular trend with the internet explosion of the late 1990s. This option allowed Russian 
women the opportunity to escape the widespread poverty of the post-Soviet period. It also 
encapsulated the anxieties present in Intergirl on a massive, coordinated scale.  Ironically 
enough, the moralizing intelligentsia of the glasnost era, who denounced a proliferation 
of sexually explicit material, may not have imagined such trends in their worst 
nightmares.  
Sex has also become a mainstay in television, popularly thought to be beyond 
reproach.  During the late Soviet era, television was a vital ideological apparatus of the 
state. A handful of channels screened Party ideologues’ speeches at intermittent intervals, 
ideological cartoons for children, and documentaries following upstanding Soviet 
citizens. While some programs were imported from the west during the glasnost period, 
there was hardly a trace of sex or sexuality in Soviet television. Television’s role as a 
predominantly state-controlled medium remains a characteristic of post-Soviet Russia. 
Recognizing television’s potential as an ideological engine, President Putin seized control 
of several independent channels in 2000, bringing them once again under state control.182 
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Yet in a post-Soviet television milieu that continues to be primarily state-controlled, sex 
has become an omnipresent phenomenon.  
Journalist Peter Pomerantsev describes how the “gold digger” phenomenon has 
infiltrated Russian television in the 2000s, drawing on experience working on his first 
television production job in Russia. He chronicles his involvement in producing a 
program called How to Marry a Millionaire (A Gold Digger’s Guide), a reality show 
following the Gold Digger Academy in Moscow, a course teaching women how to utilize 
their sexuality to hook a wealthy man, as either for a husband or a lover.183 According to 
Pomerantsev, there are dozens of such “academies” in Moscow and St. Petersburg, with 
names like “Geisha School” or “How to Be a Real Woman.”184 The message behind 
shows like these is quite unambiguous: a woman’s sexuality is her greatest asset. This 
idea has steadily expanded into various television programs, even in seemingly 
nonsensical ways. In 2000, a television show called The Naked Truth aired on a major 
channel, and featured an attractive young woman undressing as she delivered the latest 
news.185 Engel contextualizes this phenomenon by noting, “In a highly competitive 
market, where funds were scarce and the rate of failure high, seasoning a product with 
women’s sexuality boosted sales.”186 It would seem, then, that post-Soviet Russians have 
embraced the concept of “sex sells.” 
Cinema has also felt the pull of a newly competitive market, as filmmakers battle 
for Russian viewership against domestic and foreign opponents, as well as the expanded 
realm of television. According to Faraday, Russian viewers lost their appetite for “the 
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discourses of sobriety,” and the chernukha film cycle faded out by the end of 1991.187 He 
further argues that post-Soviet filmmakers did not lose their proclivity for creating films 
with moral and ideological messages, despite their move away from highlighting social 
problems.188 Yet filmmakers recognize that their productions must fit certain criteria to 
preform successfully in a post-Soviet film industry that only recently began its recovery 
from the economic crises of the 1990s. Faraday notes, “the post-perestroika period 
produced films that fell under the category of messianic populist, in that they offered 
audiences a moral message in popularly accessible form.”189 It is difficult to say without 
further analysis which tendency, moral or commercial, currently dominates the 
contemporary Russian cinematic milieu.  
Post-Soviet Russian cinema has tended to depict life as generally light-hearted 
and fun, or as Pomerantsev notes, “rosy.” While aspects of Russian life, such as career 
and family life, have been portrayed in more buoyant ways in post-Soviet cinema, sex, 
however, has largely remained characterized by aggressive misogyny. 190  According to 
Engel, “No film appeared [in the post-Soviet period] without at least one graphic, 
frequently brutal and sadistic, sexual encounter, sometimes entirely unrelated to the 
plot.”191 The violent sexuality in contemporary Russian film reflects more than the 
fulfillment of criteria in the production of a commercially viable film, but as Borenstein 
argues, the continuation of implicit aggression towards the metaphorical “Motherland,” 
which has ostensibly failed to make good on perestroika-era promises.192 
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The question, then, is: what is the social and moral context of this seemingly 
unrestrained sexual permissiveness in culture and the popular press? Pomerantsev argues 
that cultural producers of Russia’s twenty-first century can no longer be classified as the 
intelligentsia class, which has been steadily replaced by aggressive capitalists, searching 
for the perfect profit formula.193 They have adopted the concept of “sex sells,” first 
popularized in the west. Yet economic motives do not fully account for the continued 
proliferation of sexual imagery, especially violent and sexist depictions, in contemporary 
Russian culture. Feminism continues to be a dirty word in Russia, gender roles are still 
largely viewed as binary and innate, and the concept of the heterosexual-procreative 
family is buttressed rather than challenged.194 Sociologist Elena Omelchenko concludes 
that young people, the “children of perestroika,” are generally in favor of state regulation 
in regards to what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate sexuality, citing “protecting 
the family structure” as their primary concern.195 This data is reinforced with the 
establishment of several “profamily” measures since 2006, mostly targeted at limiting the 
collective power and visual presence of LGBT Russians. Thus, like in the glasnost 
period, the proliferation of explicit sexual material has not generally aligned with the 
stated moral values of many Russians, both private citizens and members of the 
governing body.  
This contemporary situation constitutes a paradox: legal norms and public opinion 
grow more conservative while the cultural media perpetuates explicit sexual imagery. 
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Women are ostensibly given robust sexual agency within the “gold digger” trope, and yet 
public opinion and “profamily” legislation would suggest that many Russians continue to 
view women’s appropriate path as one towards marriage and family. It is important to 
keep in mind, however, that while women’s sexuality has been allowed more public 
visibility, sexual visibility does not necessarily mean that the definition of normative 
sexuality has expanded in post-Soviet Russia. The “gold digger” utilizes her sexuality 
towards the goal of securing a wealthy husband, for the purpose of acting as wife and 
mother to children. In this instance, perhaps, the ends justify the means. Ultimately, the 
link between women’s sexuality and family remains unbroken from the glasnost era to 
the post-Soviet years: women’s sexuality is acceptable insofar as it eventually leads to 
marriage and children.  
The concept of the virile Russian man, however, has definitely gained traction in 
the post-Soviet period. According to Engel, the newly established market has provided 
men an ostensible means in which to redeem their masculinity after a perceived period of 
crisis.196 It rewards such traits as aggression and competitiveness. President Putin is well 
known in Russia and the west as the encapsulation of this new masculine paradigm.197 
The rehabilitated Russian man is also sexually dominant, seen as retaking his innate 
control at the top of the gender hierarchy, and possibly even punishing women for their 
perceived transgressions during the Soviet period. Sexual violence towards women in 
Russian culture, can then, in part, be analyzed within the dynamic gender constructions of 
the post-Soviet period.  
                                                                
196 Engel, Women in Russia, 265. 
197 Pomerantsev, Nothing is True, 16. 
 
 
 95  
 
It is impossible, however, to make conclusive statements about the social, 
political, and moral contexts of contemporary Russian discourses on sex without a 
rigorous scholarly analysis. Within such a study, as in this one, it is necessary to establish 
the identity of the cultural producers and journalist who generate these discourses. 
Although the social, political, and economic changes of the last quarter century have 
painted a convoluted picture of who produces discourses on sex and what their explicit 
and implicit motivations may be, scholars should continue to be wary of associating 
visible sexuality with egalitarianism.  
 The erstwhile examination of filmmakers’ and journalists’ discourses on sex 
during the glasnost period provides one such example of a time and place where the 
widespread circulation of sexual discourse cannot reasonably be associated with sexual 
liberalism or gender egalitarianism. The misleading portrait of sexual progressivism in 
the glasnost era, which superficially masked intellectuals’ enduring notions of sexuality 
as primarily associated with procreation, proved to be the latest chapter in Soviets’ 
problematic history of conceptualizing human sexuality. Intellectuals’ discourses on sex 
in the perestroika period reflect a wider sense of social, moral, and political disharmony, 
not a fundamental reevaluation of sex’s role in Soviet society. Sex appears regularly in 
cinema and the popular press in the glasnost period, and yet the presence of this 
previously forbidden theme does not reflect a major change in how intellectuals 
conceptualized sex and sexuality. Filmmakers and journalists ascribed sexuality a 
“negative” connotation, linking it to familial instability and moral decay. Moreover, the 
disproportionally destructive weight women’s sexualities carried in glasnost-era film and 
news media suggests that intellectuals did not implicitly or explicitly extend gender 
 
 
 96  
 
equality to the sexual realm. Ultimately, sexuality, especially women’s sexuality, was 
assigned the role of preliminary phenomenon in a Soviet parade of horribles, one which 
was purported to conclude with social, political, and moral anarchy.  
 An analysis of discourses on sex in contemporary Russian society would also 
require an evaluation of the extent of interconnectedness between the state and the 
producers of discourse. It will be necessary to establish to what degree, if at all, the 
producers of discourse in the twenty-first century directly represent the state. Even in 
post-Soviet Russia, and especially in western journalism, the state is frequently deemed 
to be interchangeable with nongovernmental bodies. It would be a mistake to neglect the 
sociopolitical autonomy of modern filmmakers, journalists, and television producers, and 
to assume that contemporary Russia is a totalitarian state. With that said, evaluating the 
extent of interconnectedness between discourse producers and the state in Russia’s 
twenty-first century may yield interesting results, considering the state’s renewed 
involvement in journalism and television, with the establishment of state-controlled news 
sources like Russia Today and NTV (National Television).  
 Challenging the notion of the Soviet totalitarian state has been an overarching 
theme of the preceding chapters as well. The state had varying degrees of power over 
journalistic and film discourses at different periods in Soviet history. In the last years of 
the Soviet Union, Gorbachev’s glasnost reforms created the comparatively highest levels 
of autonomy among cultural producers. In fact, the Soviet Union was flooded with 
hardcore pornographic materials, both foreign and domestic, by the beginning of the 
1990s. Soviet officials never established a comprehensive system of censorship to 
regulate pornography to replace the previous catch-all system. Intellectuals, filmmakers 
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and journalists, also utilized sex in their productions. However, they expressed 
conservatism by using sex and sexuality as a discursive proxy to bemoan the perceived 
damages of supposed sexual permissiveness. They did so without the prompting of any 
official bodies, in part as a fulfillment of their unofficial yet obligatory roles as moral 
vanguards. Thus, this study contributes to a growing series of scholarship in the twenty-
first century that challenges the notion of autocracy in Soviet Russia at various points in 
its history, and aims to reveal a more nuanced understanding of Soviet’s social, moral, 
and political concerns in the glasnost period.  
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